Deforestation: An Overview of Global Programs and Agreements

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CONTENTS FOR THIS SECTION

THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT:
Forest Principles, Agenda 21, and U.S. Forests for the Future Initiative
Background
U.S. Participation
The Forest Principles
-- Negotiation of the Principles/Key Issues
-- The U.S. Proposal for Forest Principles
-- The Outcome of the Forest Principles Negotiations
-- Reactions
Agenda 21
UNCED and the TFAP
The Future: A Global Forest Agreement?
-- The New ITTA and Prospects for a Global Forest Agreement
Forests for the Future Initiative
-- The Theory Behind the Initiative
-- Arguments in Support of the Initiative
-- Arguments Against the Initiative
-- Implementation
-- Suggestions

THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT:
Forest Principles, Agenda 21, and U.S. Forests for the Future Initiative

Preparations for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Brazil in June drove activities concerning international environmental affairs at a frantic pace in the 1990s. The "Earth Summit", as it was dubbed, concluded with the signing of an unprecedented number of treaties and documents by leaders of over 100 nations. Treaties were signed to control global warming and biodiversity loss and non-binding agreements were reached on a statement of forest conservation principles, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and Agenda 21, a book-sized document intended to lay out a course of action on environment and development through the 21st Century.

The meeting created increased public awareness concerning environmental protection and its importance in economic development. It also brought over 9000 NGOs together to focus on UNCED issues. However, it was criticized by many as falling short of its objectives. Maurice Strong, the chief organizer, said the outcome was "agreement without sufficient commitment," suggesting that the wealthy nations did not adequately commit to transfer technology and funds to help the developing nations.

The Earth Summit also helped to concentrate the attention of all governments on the 28 percent of developing countries' and 33 percent of developed countries' land areas that are officially classified as forested.(32) Many of the tensions between the North and the South were played out in the debate over a set of Forest Principles and the Agenda 21 section on forests. Questions surrounding additional financial resources proved to be among the most contentious. Though many industrialized countries consider their environmental well-being dependent upon changes in natural resource management in other countries, many of the less developed countries are unwilling to forgo the types of development practiced by the developed countries without compensation or economic incentives.

Though agreement was eventually reached on the non-binding Forest Principles and Agenda 21 chapter on forests, some observers of the negotiations in both areas have expressed concern that little of the negotiated text delineates actions that would actually reduce deforestation. While there was extensive agreement on the need for "sustainable management", many argue that what this means in practice, and how these ideals will be implemented, remains unclear.

The results of UNCED left open the possibility of negotiating a global convention on forests, but even if one is pursued, it is highly unlikely that such an agreement will be negotiated quickly. For the foreseeable future, the two documents on forests signed at UNCED will be the "baseline" for international forest issues.

An additional factor in the UNCED scenario was a U.S. initiative on forests put forth shortly before the beginning of the Conference. The Forests for the Future Initiative may have partially responded to the calls of the developing nations for additional financial transfers as it proposed a doubling of current international forest conservation assistance including a U.S. contribution of an additional $150 million in bilateral assistance in the next year. Most of the details remain to be defined.

Background

Established by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 44/228 (adopted December 22, 1989) UNCED took place from June 3-15, 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The event was timed to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment which brought significant international attention to the environment. Designed to address the full spectrum of environment and development issues and their interconnections, the Resolution identified the "protection and management of land resources, including combating deforestation, desertification, and drought" among a number of specific issues to be considered at UNCED.

Among the most significant outcomes of the UNCED meeting was Agenda 21, a non-binding action plan to implement the vision outlined in the Rio Declaration, including a chapter on forests. In addition, the United States, other G-7 countries, and some other nations expressed a strong interest in having a global forest convention ready for signing at UNCED. It was thought that UNCED preparatory negotiations might serve as a forum for formulating such a convention, but many nations, especially several developing countries, strongly resisted rapid negotiation of a binding forest treaty. Instead, a closely watched outcome of UNCED was a "non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles for a global consensus on the management, conservation, and sustainable development of all types of forests."

The 1992 U.N. General Assembly meeting in the fall will have the decision-making role in terms of establishing the institutional follow-up. The Agenda 21 chapter on institutions suggests the establishment of a Commission on Sustainable Development that would report to the General Assembly for policy and to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) concerning coordination of U.N. agencies. It is expected that this Commission will have a key role in tracking implementation of all the agreements and decisions made at UNCED.

U.S. Participation

The United States was an active participant in the UNCED Preparatory Committee meetings (PrepComs). U.S. participation was coordinated by the State Department under Curtis Bohlen, Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES). A U.S. coordinating office within OES was established, and coordinated input from a wide variety of U.S. agencies on key issues, including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the USDA Forest Service, and USAID, among others.

Forest management and conservation was an issue of highest priority for the United States in the UNCED negotiations.

The Forest Principles

In July of 1989, the Group of Seven (the "club" of seven major industrialized countries known as the "G-7" -- the United States, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, and Japan) met in Paris for the fifteenth annual Economic Summit of industrialized nations. The statement that came of that meeting identified "the urgent need to safeguard the environment for future generations" among the three main challenges to the world economic situation. Specifically regarding deforestation, the 1989 G-7 statement declared:

We call for the adoption of sustainable forest management practices, with a view to preserving the scale of world forests....

Preserving the tropical forests is an urgent need for the world as a whole. While recognizing the sovereign rights of developing countries to make use of their natural resources, we encourage, through a [sic] sustainable use of tropical forests, the protection of all the species therein and the traditional rights to land and other resources of local communities. We welcome the German initiative in this field as a basis for progress.

To this end, we give strong support to rapid implementation of the Tropical Forest Action Plan which was adopted in 1986 in the framework of the Food and Agricultural Organization. We appeal to both consumer and producer countries, which are united in the International Tropical Timber Organization, to join their efforts to ensure better conservation of the forests. We express our readiness to assist the efforts of nations with tropical forests through financial and technical cooperation, and in international organizations.(33)

Partially in response to a perceived need to add some substance to this declaration, President Bush proposed that negotiations begin on an international convention on forests at the next summit opportunity in July 1990 in Houston. As a result, the Houston Statement of the G-7 called for negotiations "to begin expeditiously and be completed by 1992, on a global forest convention or agreement to curb deforestation, protect biodiversity, stimulate positive forestry actions and address threats to the world's forests."(34)

A striking feature of the Houston Statement was that it addressed forests in general -- temperate and boreal as well as tropical. For the first time, the political necessity of dealing with both tropical and temperate forests was to be addressed in a global policy framework. Whatever the future course of international negotiations regarding forests, the need to relate forest policy to both temperate and tropical forest areas is likely to remain on the international agenda. Further, by calling for a convention or agreement by 1992, the Houston Statement clearly referred to UNCED, raising the profile and importance of the conference for forests and expectations as to what it might achieve.

Negotiation of the Principles/Key Issues

The United States and other G-7 countries originally considered the negotiation of a global convention on forests a major goal of UNCED. However, a number of factors combined to preclude this.

Most developing nations were unwilling to rush negotiations along to meet the June 1992 deadline on an agreement that could have profound effects on their development. In addition, the call for a global convention on forests came amidst great difficulty in reaching agreement among the G-7 on actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Consequently, many tropical countries viewed the idea of a convention on world forests as an effort by northern countries to control deforestation in the name of the global environment while sidestepping the issue of their own responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions. They expressed considerable resentment that the G-7 should expect them to take difficult actions if they could not manage to agree on equally difficult steps for themselves. Further, most developing nations viewed U.S. enthusiasm for a global forest agreement with some skepticism since the Bush Administration's position was deliberately vague on the subject of primary (old-growth) forests in the United States.

Perhaps equally important, many developing countries were unwilling to negotiate an agreement that might lead to dramatic reductions in timber harvests and a loss of foreign currency without some form of compensation. In particular, developing countries with major timber resources demanded new and additional funding from industrialized countries to pay for any requirements imposed by a convention, while the industrialized nations argued for more specific assurances about what developing countries would do in exchange for such assistance.

At the second UNCED preparatory meeting in the spring of 1991, developing countries strongly opposed the idea of a convention on forests, effectively derailing U.S. hopes for a world forest convention that would be ready in time for Rio. Instead, consensus developed for a "non-legally binding statement of principles." Although the United States accepted that objective for UNCED, it continued to push for a later treaty, presumably basing negotiations on the Principles formulated at UNCED.

The decision to consider a non-binding statement of principles, rather than something more authoritative, such as a forest convention, reflected the view that there was relatively little consensus about the substance of a convention and insufficient time to reach a consensus before the 1992 meeting. This was substantiated by the fact that the negotiation of even the non-binding Principles encountered major difficulties.

Developing countries objected to any statement of "global interest" in forests. Blocking agreement on several drafts, developing countries, often led by Malaysia and India, objected to language that they claimed "intruded on their autonomy," asserting that forests, like oil, are not a global asset -- as industrial countries view them -- and that each country has the sovereign right to determine how best to manage them. In addition, they insisted that the document recognize the patterns of overconsumption in the developed countries and the need for greater development in the South. The developed countries countered with a demand that the Principles acknowledge the importance of forests to the interests of the world community.

Another sticking point was language calling for a global convention on forests. Developing countries were opposed to any agreement on a global forest treaty as a later objective though the North viewed the Principles as an important starting point for negotiating a forest convention after UNCED.

Other sources of discontent that affected negotiations regarding forests included a consistently hard U.S. line on the key G-77 issues of sovereignty, the "right to develop", equity, the special responsibility of developed countries in "greening the world", U.S. reluctance to entertain the prospect of providing additional financial resources for environmental protection in other countries, and the U.S. position on climate change, which the G-77 held up as an example of poor U.S. credibility on global environmental matters, and an excuse to proceed with caution on the Forest Principles.

As a result of these disagreements, the forest negotiations closed on a hostile, uncooperative note at the final UNCED preparatory meeting in March 1992. Nearly half of the paragraphs in the Principles remained in brackets when the text was forwarded to the meeting in Rio. Unresolved paragraphs addressed (a) cross-cutting issues such as finance, technology cooperation and trade, (b) issues being debated in the climate change or biodiversity convention negotiations, or (c) other basic issues such as the right to develop, which were under consideration in the Rio Declaration. Agreement on Forest Principles in Rio was expected to ultimately depend on resolution of cross-cutting issues, particularly finance and technology cooperation, and U.S. action on climate change.

The U.S. Proposal for Forest Principles

After the second preparatory meeting in March/April 1991, when it was clear that a non-binding statement of forest principles was to usurp a global forest agreement as a main objective regarding forests at UNCED, the United States formulated its own Principles and related actions to form the basis for its position on the elements of a global convention on forests. The proposal identified seven "general principles" to define the nature and structure of a forest agreement and eleven "specific principles" targeting areas of forest policy and management. (See Appendix D: U.S. Principles for a Global Forest Agreement.) In addition, the proposal identified general and specific actions that could be used to implement the principles, including sustainable management, conservation of forest diversity, reforestation and rehabilitation, inventory and research, education and training, and others.

Going into the fourth and final preparatory meeting in March 1992, the bracketed text on Forest Principles contained language generally consistent with the thrust of the U.S. proposal, with some notable exceptions.

U.S. negotiators would have liked to delete or largely modify most paragraphs addressing the following financial, technology cooperation, trade, and other issues:

• -the principle of equitable sharing of costs;
• -the principle of new and additional resources;
• -the link between deforestation and indebtedness, the net transfer of resources from the south to the north, and the need to eliminate poverty;
• -the principle of compensation to developing countries for undertaking forest conservation and sustainable management;
• -the right to biotechnology transfer and profit sharing from pharmaceutical and other products derived from tropical forests;
• -the concessional and preferential transfer of technology;
• -guaranteed minimum timber prices;
• -the introduction of international and national regulation to avoid foreign and national exploitation which might undermine non-discriminatory access to forest resources;
• -sweeping statements calling for the removal of all forms of unilateral action to restrict the trade in and use of forest products;
• -the right of countries to economic development; and
• -criticisms of the industrialized countries for their unsustainable and polluting lifestyles.

In addition, the United States would have preferred to strengthen language regarding the role of market forces, international cooperation, and global stewardship, including reinforcing or adding the following:

• -the concepts of market-based mechanisms and appropriate economic incentives;
• -the importance of removing harmful subsidies;
• -the concept that countries should be encouraged to cooperate with one another in order to identify areas for efficient joint implementation and realize shared forest management goals; and
• -the concepts of cooperative stewardship, global benefits, and the global responsibility of beneficiary countries.

However, the United States was ultimately forced to retreat from a firm stand on the content of the Principles due to domestic political constraints that surfaced mainly as a result of contentious issues surrounding the old-growth forests of the Pacific Northwest.

The Outcome of the Forest Principles Negotiations

In eleventh-hour negotiations, delegates to the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro agreed upon a set of voluntary Forest Principles.(35) The final statement found a middle ground, declaring that states have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies and the inalienable right to utilize, manage and develop their forests in accordance with their development needs, "on a sustainable basis." In addition, Principles of particular relevance to U.S. concerns include the following:

• -the full incremental cost of achieving benefits associated with forest conservation and sustainable development requires increased international cooperation and should be equitably shared by the international community;
• -new and additional financial resources should be provided to enable developing countries to sustainably manage, conserve, and develop their forest resources;
• -the efforts of developing countries to strengthen the management, conservation and sustainable development of their forest resources should be supported by the international community, taking into account the importance of redressing external indebtedness, particularly where aggravated by the net transfer of resources to developed countries;
• -efforts should be made to promote a supportive international economic climate, including the promotion of sustainable patterns of production and consumption, the eradication of poverty, and the promotion of food security;
• -to enhance developing country capacity to better manage, conserve and develop their forest resources, the access to and transfer of environmentally sound technologies on favorable terms, including concessional or preferential terms, should be promoted, facilitated, and financed;
• -trade in forest products should be based on non-discriminatory and multilaterally agreed rules and procedures consistent with international trade law and practices. In this context, open and free international trade in forest products should be facilitated;
• -reduction or removal of tariff barriers and impediments to the provision of better market access and better prices for higher value-added forest products and their local processing should be encouraged to enable producer countries to better conserve and manage their renewable forest resources;
• -incorporation of environmental costs and benefits into market forces and mechanisms, in order to achieve forest conservation and sustainable development, should be encouraged both domestically and internationally; and
• -unilateral measures to restrict and/or ban international trade in timber or other forest products should be removed or avoided.

Though it does not explicitly call for one, the statement of Principles does not exclude the possibility of a future convention. It was suggested that the proposed new Sustainable Development Commission, established to review Earth Summit commitments, bring the issue up at a later date. (See Appendix E: UNCED Forest Principles.)

Reactions

Environmentalists are generally unhappy with final statement of Forest Principles. They claim that though the Principles include many positive elements, the statement is inadequate and unlikely to create a suitable framework for future negotiations. In fact, some see the Principles as a step backward from measures already taken, asserting that they are actually weaker than the revised TFAP "Goals and Objectives" statement, the existing World Bank forest policy which prohibits financing logging in tropical moist forests, and the ITTO Target 2000 which aims to limit all trade in tropical timber to that originating from sustainably managed sources.

Critics also charge that the Forest Principles fail to address such fundamental goals as halting global deforestation, ensuring that trade in forest products is based on environmentally sustainable sources, and committing to the preparation, adoption and implementation of a comprehensive world forest strategy. In addition, they fault the document for only partially protecting existing natural forests, confronting the underlying causes of forest destruction such as clearing for agricultural land, guaranteeing the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, and ensuring that forest management policies are based on a strong scientific foundation.

On the other hand, the Forest Principles are viewed by some -- including many who were active in the negotiating process -- as an important consensus statement and starting point for future negotiations. The concept of sustainable development is at least clearly articulated in the Forest Principles, they say, though it may not be completely clear what the Principles mean in practice.

Agenda 21

In addition to the Forest Principles, an entire chapter of Agenda 21 on "Combatting Deforestation" was negotiated at UNCED. Agenda 21 is the most comprehensive product of the Earth Summit. It is an environment and development agenda for the remainder of this century, providing the framework and institutional modifications to be accomplished over the next decade. It affects all sectors of society and establishes strategies to coordinate efforts regionally and globally by identifying the policies necessary to create the required environment-development linkages, recommending new environmental laws to preserve the ecological balance of the planet and setting out a specific action plan for drought and desertification, and defining new ways and means of integrating environment and economy and identifying ways of providing new financial resources. Each Agenda 21 chapter identifies a basis for action, objectives, activities, and means of implementation for each program. A voluntary program of action, it addresses a wide range of issues, including a chapter on combatting deforestation.

The United States, along with other countries, submitted proposals for Agenda 21 to be taken up in the fourth and final UNCED preparatory meeting. For the forests chapter, the United States suggested a global objective to "achieve conservation and sustainable management of all forests to meet present and future needs for economic and ecological services." The United States also proposed five program areas:

• -Greening the world through the pursuit of national goals and objectives. Specific actions could include: rehabilitation and restoration of degraded lands, reforestation and afforestation, controlling deforestation, designating protected areas, and improved management of natural forests.
• -Negotiate a free-standing convention on forests to build world vision and commitment using the guiding Principles on forests as a basis. Specific actions could include: commitment to begin negotiations within an agreed time after UNCED, and designating or establishing a negotiating forum;
• -Harnessing market forces to help meet national interests to improve the long-term health and productivity of forest resources for the production of employment, income, forest products, services, recreation and habitat. Specific actions could include: improving economic and social accounting, freeing trade, and improving accounting for environmental costs and benefits;
• -Achieving common interests by improving coordination and cooperation among institutions and better integrating programs based on the statement of Principles on forests. Specific actions could include coordinating and cooperating among UN organizations and programs, bilateral organizations and programs, local and indigenous communities, NGOs and activities, etc.;
• -Measuring global progress through inventories of key variables. Specific actions could include inventory and assessment of forest health, biological diversity, deforestation rates and patterns, ecological changes, etc.

More substantial agreement was in evidence in the negotiation of this text than in discussions surrounding the Forest Principles. After a slow start, negotiations on the forests chapter proceeded in a generally positive atmosphere. By the end of the final PrepCom, agreement was reached on Agenda 21 for forests in all significant areas except for a legal instrument on forests.

The final Agenda 21 section on forests is a very general document. It outlines a broad and comprehensive agenda in four program areas:

• -Sustaining the Multiple Roles and Functions of Forests: objectives include strengthening institutions, skills, expertise, and capabilities;
• -Protecting Conserving and Sustainable Managing Forests: objectives include maintaining and expanding forests; devising national forestry action programs; conserving and sustainably managing forests; maintaining and increasing the biological, socio-cultural, ecological, climatic, and economic contributions of forests; and implementing the Forest Principles;
• -Promoting Efficient Utilization and Assessment: objectives include recognizing the social, economic, and ecological values of forests; using forest resources efficiently, rationally, and sustainably; developing efficient and sustainable fuelwood and energy supplies; and encouraging ecotourism; and
• -Planning, Assessment. and Periodical Evaluations: objectives include devising systems for assessment and periodical evaluations, and providing information to officials and communities.

In addition, the chapter includes a long list of initiatives to achieve these objectives, including strengthening forestry laws, plans, education, and research; beginning a massive global effort to expand the area under forest cover; improving techniques to sustainably manage forests; creating a system to assess and monitor the state of forest resources; and expanding mechanisms for regional and international cooperation on forestry (36)

Though the United States failed to achieve a commitment to negotiate a free-standing convention on forests, U.S. concerns for "greening the world" and measuring global progress as expressed in the Agenda 21 proposal are well represented in the final chapter on forests. "Greening of the world" is also explicitly stated as a Forest Principle. Other U.S. objectives of harnessing market forces and achieving common interests are not so apparently represented in the final Agenda 21 document. These goals are more clearly stated in the Forest Principles.

Agenda 21 discusses future international cooperation on forests and leaves the possibility open for the negotiation of a future convention on the subject, but fails to explicitly call for a global forest agreement.

Notably, section 11.14(a) the Agenda 21 chapter on forests regards implementation of the Forest Principles, calling for the nations of the world to:

Facilitate and support effective implementation of the non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles for a global consensus on the management, conservation, and sustainable development of all types of forests, adopted by UNCED, and on the basis of implementation of these principles to consider the need for and the feasibility of all kinds of appropriate internationally agreed arrangements to promote international cooperation on forest management, conservation, and sustainable development of all types of forests, including afforestation, reforestation, and rehabilitation.(37)

UNCED and the TFAP

The Earth Summit may have helped to revitalize current efforts to combat deforestation by stimulating new interest in international forestry. However, the Agenda 21 chapter on forests' mention of the TFAP is a general one. While it specifically recognizes the role that the TFAP is playing at the national level -- a suggestion of the TFAP Advisor's Group -- the final document does not provide specific guidance regarding management and implementation procedures for the TFAP.

In fact, the TFAP Advisors had criticized a draft of the chapter for falling short in several crucial respects. According to them:

• -It lacked vision and appeal, was unlikely to attract imagination and support, and was likely to compare unfavorably with more substantive Agenda 21 proposals in other areas;
• -The draft comprised a shopping list encompassing practically all issues related to forests. There was a lack of priority ranking of proposals, which were presented without conviction or a sense of urgency;
• -Too little emphasis was placed on improving cooperation and effectiveness in existing international institutions which were manifestly not able to work in concert to solve global problems;
• -Greater emphasis should be placed on strengthening national capacities to respond to local and regional needs and to enable better cooperation with international institutions and initiatives;
• -There was insufficient attention to a participatory approach designed to take advantage of local technical knowledge and to address the needs of the rural poor.

Neither the Forest Principles nor Agenda 21 conflict with TFAP activities. On the contrary, TFAP actions could complement the achievement of UNCED objectives. Indeed, there is an emerging sense in many quarters that limited gains are to be achieved from international discussions on forest conservation and that, instead, efforts should be concentrated on utilizing existing institutions such as bilateral agreements, National Forestry Action Plans, and national conservation strategies and action plans, which can receive international support as appropriate.

So far, the institutional relationship between the TFAP and UNCED follow-up activities remains fairly nebulous. The Consultative Forum process of the TFAP could be closely linked with post-UNCED forest discussions if they result in the formation of a group to discuss a global forest agreement or policy. The possible elevation of the Forum's profile could be regarded as reinforcing the need for an effective, sustained and unified international program to support national programs on forest resources.

The Future: A Global Forest Agreement?

The likelihood that the nations of the world will produce an international convention on forests anytime in the near future is extremely slim. There is little momentum in the developing countries for such an agreement, since the producer nations in general, led by Malaysia, see little need for one and consider that they could pay a heavy price for such an agreement.(38) In addition, developing countries are unlikely to undertake any further negotiations until they see what the northern nations do to implement the Forest Principles and Agenda 21 chapter on forests and to limit carbon dioxide emissions.

Considerable political will and an international forum for negotiation would be necessary to further the debate on a global forest agreement. Moreover, countries like the United States will have to have the will to take actions domestically on difficult issues such as preserving more old-growth forests.

If these conditions were met, however, some of the elements of a convention on forests could include the following:

• -providing for nationally prepared forest land use plans to define the forest estate and set production and conservation targets to serve as a basis for development assistance and economic policy reforms;
• -establishing a centralized monitoring system for forests worldwide to provide agreed upon data, including rates of loss;
• -requiring forest conservation commitments in developed nations for their own forests;
• -recognizing the interests of forest-dwelling peoples and providing for direct local participation in decision-making processes;
• -requesting countries to designate Forest Areas of Special Importance for heightened protection and international recognition; and
• -considering the creation of an international program for tracing and authenticating sustainably-produced timber in domestic and international commerce.

In general, if the nations of the world do attempt to negotiate an international convention on forests, developing countries can be expected to be highly protective of their sovereignty over their own natural resources, to be reluctant to accept any obligations that might be considered harmful to their long-term economic development, to be skeptical of any proposal that appears to put most of the blame for deforestation on them, and to seek new financing to compensate them for lost revenue.

On the other hand, in the future -- as in the past -- the industrialized countries may try to persuade tropical governments to initiate policy reforms while avoiding making significant new financial obligations or quid pro quo agreements that might have negative economic impacts at home (such as banning logging in all old-growth forests). As long as developing nations perceive the United States as increasing its energy consumption without conservation, it will probably be significantly more difficult to convince developing countries such as Brazil and Indonesia to reduce timber production and increase conservation efforts as part of their shared global responsibility.

The New ITTA and Prospects for a Global Forest Agreement

Any substantive work on a global forest agreement is now relegated to the indefinite future. If this proves to be the near future, negotiations might overlap with the renegotiation of the ITTA. At this time, it is unclear how the new ITTA would relate to a global agreement on forests. The negotiating paths of the ITTA and the global forest convention could converge towards a 1994 agreement on a single international legal instrument on forests. On the other hand, the new ITTA could be designed to have a relatively narrow focus; as in the past, it could serve mainly as a commodity agreement.

Several ITTO member countries and some NGO observers advocate expanding the role of the ITTA in the future. In response to the Houston Declaration, the international community could focus its efforts to negotiate a global agreement on forests on renewing the ITTA, expanding the mandate of a successor agreement to cover forests in general, and obscuring the relatively narrow focus of the ITTO on the international timber trade. Some of those who would like to broaden the mandate of the ITTO favor this course of action because they recognize that the successful negotiation of a global forest agreement would probably take a minimum of five years and an expanded ITTA could be a valuable tool to use in the interim. In addition, they point out that an ITTA that responds to a perceived need for a global agreement on forests would not be inconsistent with decisions made at Rio. However, it should be remembered that, at present, the ITTO is entirely concerned with trade, which causes only a very small proportion of global deforestation. Insofar as the ITTO can encourage the development of sustainable logging techniques and the sustainable management of forests, it can contribute to reducing deforestation. But the main causes of deforestation -- clearing land for subsistence or other agriculture -- could only be addressed by a much broader general mandate, far beyond the commodity and timber trade focus of the ITTO.

Though the idea of expanding the mandate of the ITTA to become a global agreement on forests is supported by some environmentalists, and is likely to get additional sympathy from producer countries, U.S. Government officials resist the thought of having the new ITTA take the place of a global convention on forests because they consider the ITTO an inappropriate organization to assume such a role. They also worry that too many additional responsibilities would overburden this fledgling organization.

Others, including some industry representatives, caution that dramatic changes in the ITTA would be more difficult to negotiate and less likely to be achieved. They identify protecting of the current framework for cooperation as a top priority.

Whatever course is pursued, the UNCED experience indicates that developing countries will surely demand compensation in return for the concessions they make in renegotiating the ITTA. For this reason, the chances of successfully negotiating some of the more controversial suggestions for ITTA reform recommended by environmental interest groups (e.g., that the new ITTO should regulate trade to promote the transition to sustainability) are very slim. As they did in the UNCED process, international negotiations regarding the ITTA will likely proceed slowly and the negotiation of sensitive subjects will be particularly problematic.

The Forests for the Future Initiative

On June 1, 1992, two days before the opening of the Earth Summit, President Bush announced a new initiative to conserve the world's forests in an address in Greenbelt, Maryland. The Forests for the Future Initiative proposed to help halt deforestation and accelerate progress toward a global forest agreement.

As part of the initiative, the President proposed a goal of doubling current international forest conservation assistance from $1.35 billion to $2.7 billion next year, calling on other countries to contribute their fair share to the total. As a "downpayment" on the initiative, the United States committed to contributing an additional $150 million in bilateral forestry assistance for fiscal year 1994, more than doubling the $120 million in the bilateral forestry assistance in the President's 1993 budget.(39) This increase has been included in the President's budget for fiscal year 1994.(40) The President further pledged to continue and, as appropriate, expand this commitment in the future if other countries join in the initiative. The potential for leveraging limited U.S. dollars for forest conservation and development is a noteworthy aspect of this initiative.

The initiative was put together quickly, apparently in an effort to respond to calls for greater financial commitment at UNCED and in pursuit of U.S. objectives regarding forests. The idea is not yet clearly delineated, but sketchy details indicate that under the initiative, all nations would be invited to engage in a cooperative approach in which interested recipient nations would propose forest conservation programs and work together in "Forest Partnerships" with donors. In the partnership arrangement, potential recipients would compete for funding for the forest conservation programs they propose. This process would, in theory, ensure that the most effective and efficient programs receive financial support. To stimulate further developments, White House officials have proposed to convene a "Forest Partnership Forum" by the end of this year to bring together potential investors and recipients and to share ideas on forest conservation opportunities.

The Theory Behind the Initiative

The idea underlying the Forests for the Future concept, according to Roger Sedjo of Resources for the Future, is as follows: Forests generate important global environmental and ecological benefits that extend far beyond the boundaries of the countries in which they are located (e.g., protection of biodiversity and carbon sequestration.) At present, since the benefits of forest resources are global, but the costs of protecting them are incurred locally, no individual country has the economic incentive structure to adequately address deforestation issues. The Forests for the Future Initiative is predicated on this notion that existing markets and individual government actions are inadequate mechanisms for internalizing the ecological costs and/or benefits involved in forest conservation and/or development.

According to C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to the President, the Forests for the Future Initiative would create an international "marketplace" for forest conservation investments. Potential aid recipients would compete for funding by making their best proposals for conserving and sustainably using their forests. For example, such proposals could include creating institutes to survey forest resources or offering to revise subsidies and ownership rules that encourage forest clearing. Donor nations would likewise compete to "invest" in the best opportunities by offering funding packages for projects with the greatest potential benefits to themselves. This approach would foster "forest partnerships" between developing countries with forests and investors or lenders. Exactly how market forces could be harnessed to make forest conservation economically attractive to donor countries is an integral detail of the theory behind the initiative that has not yet been clearly delineated.

According to the plan, reliance on such cooperative arrangements would ensure that the most effective and efficient programs are funded, that the sovereignty of all nations is respected, and that programs match the needs and circumstances of recipient countries. In this way, the initiative would maximize the cost effectiveness of conservation efforts and preserve the sovereignty of nations.

Arguments in Support of the Initiative

Some view this initiative as an outgrowth of the G-7 Houston Declaration of July 1990, which called for negotiations "to begin expeditiously and to be completed by 1992 on a global forest convention or agreement to curb deforestation, protect biodiversity, stimulate positive forestry actions, and address threats to the world's forests" and a significant step in efforts to conserve the world's forests. Others consider the initiative a feeble last minute attempt to gain credibility with the environmental community and an effort to blunt criticism of the United States at UNCED for refusing to make larger financial commitments, for watering down the Global Climate Change Convention, and for refusing to sign the Biodiversity Convention.

Supporters claim that although it has not yet attracted much attention, this initiative may turn out to be a significant step in efforts to conserve the world's forests. According to proponents, the Bush proposal has the potential to set a process in motion that could ultimately result in a significant set of financial commitments to support world forest conservation by the industrialized world. Though the initiative consists simply of a commitment to provide $150 million in forest assistance in the next year, together with a commitment to continue and perhaps expand that assistance in the future, when viewed in the context of the G-7 declaration at Houston, the initiative can also be seen as intended to be a catalyst for financial commitments from the G-7 and other industrial nations.

The Forests for the Future Initiative was also designed to accelerate international progress toward a global forest agreement by encouraging globally shared investment. Though concrete actions have yet to be identified, if this scheme were able to create market incentives to make forest conservation economically attractive for both investors and recipients, it would save countries with forest resources from bearing the entire burden of preserving them -- a big plus, since efforts to advance a global forest agreement have moved so slowly due to fears that the burden of curbing deforestation would fall disproportionately on poorer countries.

Furthermore, supporters of the idea point out that the Bush initiative avoids both the difficulties of gaining signatories to agreements, which bind countries to undertaking specific domestic actions, and also of non-binding declarations of principles such as those made in Rio, which are unenforceable. Instead, the initiative envisions voluntary partnerships in which countries would be free to participate or not as they chose, much as in the case of the ongoing debt-for-nature swaps. The availability of monies for forested countries which propose acceptable programs for forest management, development, protection, conservation, and restoration would provide enough incentive for participation.

Another plus, proponents argue, is that no new international bureaucracy would have to be created: the additional resources would be mobilized through existing bilateral and multilateral avenues. At a time when many are questioning the value of international bureaucracies, which have a reputation of being inefficient, this fact could be viewed as an asset.

Finally, proponents argue that preserving and enhancing forest resources would reduce net CO2 emissions at a relatively low cost, and in fact, do more to reduce greenhouse emissions than the European proposal to stabilize industrial country CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000. Their assertion, so far without supporting analysis, states that halting net tropical forest loss by the turn of the century would reduce total CO2 emissions by more than twice the effect of the European CO2 stabilization plan -- and at a fraction of the cost.(41)

Arguments Against the Initiative

To some, President Bush's offer of funds seemed to answer the long-standing demand of developing countries that any commitment on their part to conserve forests be accompanied by an increase in development assistance to cover the additional costs of conservation. However, critics view the initiative as an exercise in polishing the President's environmental image in the face of strong criticism regarding the U.S. posture at the Earth Summit. If this initiative had been proposed apart from the Rio Summit, they suggest, it might have been regarded as a sincere attempt to address deforestation.

Furthermore, to some, though a new international forest initiative may seem an attractive option for domestic political reasons, the prospects are dim for a successful outcome anytime soon. In fact, some say the Forest Partnership Forum of this initiative could be perceived by others as a U.S. attempt to circumvent discussions at the FAO regarding the TFAP. This may be one reason why the plan has been viewed with suspicion and hostility. Furthermore, critics suggest that the problematic international discussions relating to the TFAP speak to the difficulties of such undertakings and that the highly contentious UNCED negotiations relating to forests indicates the likely rancorous tenor of future discussions on the theme.

Moreover, some observers suggest that the United States should scale back its expectations for a global "Forest Partnership Forum" since attempts to convene such a forum may run afoul of similar discussions being organized by the FAO. Calls for such a meeting would likely be perceived by G-77 countries to be an attempt by the United States to circumvent processes already underway.

The initiative's detractors also point out that the President's $150 million pledge for the world's forests is a relatively small commitment compared to the size of the problem to be tackled and compared to the pledges of some other nations. They note that other donors have already greatly increased their funding for forest conservation. For example, they cite the Brazil Rainforest Pilot Project for which Germany committed $146 million while the United States only managed to find $5 million in new funds.

In addition, critics charge that, though doubling the U.S. contribution to international forestry is a positive step, this initiative puts inordinate emphasis on funding. Along with the commitment of meaningful financial support from industrial countries, they say, halting deforestation will require a combination of policy reforms, long-term planning for the stabilization of forests, and technological cooperation.

Finally, though stopping deforestation would prevent some greenhouse gas emissions, some observers point out that greater emphasis on promoting energy efficiency, developing non-polluting, renewable energy sources, and addressing CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized nations would be far more effective in confronting the climate change challenge.

Implementation

Few of the particulars regarding the implementation of this initiative have been provided. The outlines of the initiative are vague enough that most of the details are still undefined. An interagency task force has been created to oversee the initiative and to define the process for identifying funding priorities and dispersing monies.(42) The only particulars yet established are these:

• -The funds committed will consist of "new" money. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not yet identified where the funds will come from and is working out the details;
• -The money will probably be committed through existing bilateral channels, at least for the first year. Funding through the World Bank's Global Environment Facility (GEF) or other multilateral avenues may be possible in the future;
• -Conservation-oriented projects will be favored;
• -Temperate and boreal forests are included in the initiative. Russia and China have been mentioned as possible recipients of aid.

Suggestions

Since the announcement of the initiative, observers have offered a variety of suggestions concerning its implementation. These include the following:

• -The United States should focus its efforts on countries with which it already has strong bilateral programs;
• -The United States should consider committing a specific amount of money to selected countries for forest conservation and then working within the country to identify funding priorities, rather than working with outside AID consultants who prepare project proposals;
• -The United States should use existing planning mechanisms (e.g. Environmental Action Plans, National TFAP exercises, etc.) wherever possible, taking care to avoid derailing other donor initiatives or duplicating national planning processes;
• -Implementation of the initiative should help to develop the capacities of government agencies;
• -The initiative should make investments which enhance national self-sufficiency by helping to mobilize the capacity to pay for conservation from national budgets;
• -The initiative should be used to contribute to the country capacity project of the UNDP which reflects the ideas that have emerged from several TFAP Forest Advisor's Group meetings. (The UNDP proposal suggests a method for developing in-country capacity to undertake multi-sectoral planning exercises and implement projects, shifting the decision making process into tropical countries. U.S. support could help leverage additional donor contributions.);
• -The United States should consider tagging on to already scheduled international meetings, such as discussions being organized by the FAO in conjunction with the TFAP, to discuss financing mechanisms for forest conservation;
• -The initiative should include a quick disbursement "grant" window for supporting promising local initiatives both governmental and non-governmental.

The future of the Bush initiative is uncertain. The announcement came as a surprise to most countries and few had time to articulate a response by the time world leaders met in Rio de Janeiro.

The fundamental question that will need to be resolved is how to spend large amounts of international aid to promote conservation. This is the same basic question being addressed by the GEF. In addition, the initiative is roughly modelled on the TFAP experience. These experiences should be useful in considering how to implement the Forests for the Future Initiative.

Endnotes

32. World Resources Institute. World Resources 1990-91. Oxford University Press. New York, 1990. pp. 268-269.

33. "Economic Declaration." Summit of the Arch. Paris, July 16, 1989.

34. The Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. "Proposed Global Forests Convention." Washington, DC, July 11, 1990. (press release)

35. See: "Adoption of Agreements on Environment and Development: Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests." A/CONF.151/6/Rev.1. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 13, 1992.

36. See: "Combatting Deforestation, "Agenda 21, (Chapter 11, Advance Copy). United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 14, 1992.

37. "Combatting Deforestation," Agenda 21 (Chapter 11, Advance Copy). United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 14, 1992. p. 8.

38. Malaysia, in particular, resents the criticism it has faced for its own timber harvest practices.

39. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. "Forests for the Future Initiative: Fact Sheet." Washington, DC, June 1, 1992. pp. 1, 2. (press release)

40. This increase will bring U.S. funds available for international forestry assistance to more than $485 million.

41. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. "Forests for the Future Initiative: Fact Sheet." June 1, 1992. p. 1.

42. The task force includes representatives from the State Department, USAID, the USDA Forest Service, and the EPA, among others.