97002: The Department of
Energy's
Tritium Production Program
Richard E. Rowberg
Science Policy Research Division
Clifford Lau
Science Policy Research Division
Updated September 10, 1998
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
- Role of Tritium
- Why It Is
Needed
- What
Is Tritium and How Is It Made?
- Tritium
Production Technologies
- Congressional
Considerations
- DOE Activities
- Congressional
Actions
- Program Issues
LEGISLATION
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
SUMMARY
Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen used to enhance
the explosive yield of every thermonuclear weapon. Tritium has a
radioactive decay rate of 5.5% per year and has not been produced
in this country for weapons purposes since 1988.
To compensate for decay losses, tritium levels in the existing
stockpile are being maintained by recycling and reprocessing it
from dismantled nuclear weapons. To maintain the nuclear weapons
stockpile at the level called for in the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) II (not yet in force), however, a new tritium
source would be needed by the year 2011. If the START I stockpile
levels remain the target, as is now the case, tritium production
would be needed by 2005.
On December 6, 1995, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued a
Record of Decision to pursue a dual-track approach to develop the
two options it considered most promising. The first is to
investigate the purchase of the services of an existing
commercial reactor or the reactor itself to supply radiation for
transforming lithium into tritium (CLWR). The second is to
design, build, and test a particle accelerator at Savannah River
to drive tritium-producing nuclear reactions (APT).
Both options could meet the 2011 deadline but only the CLWR
option could be ready by 2005. If tritium is needed sooner, an
interim source may be necessary. One possible source, the Fast
Flux Test Facility (FFTF) in Hanford, WA, appears to no longer be
an option because of nuclear proliferation concerns. grounds.
Several issues remain to be resolved before a long term source
can be built. Included are accelerator technical uncertainties,
target development for the reactor option, cost uncertainties,
regulatory requirements, potential environmental consequences,
and nuclear proliferation concerns that may arise if civilian and
defense nuclear operations are combined on a single facility. DOE
is scheduled to announce its choice for a long-term option by the
end of 1998. Whatever its choice, work will continue on the
remaining option for a period of time as a backup.
A demonstration is currently underway at the TVA Watts Bar
plant of technology for producing tritium in and extracting it
from a commercial reactor. In response to a DOE request, TVA has
submitted a bid for DOE to fund completion of its Bellefonte
plant with DOE receiving a portion of the plant's revenues in
addition to the tritium.
The FY1999 defense authorization bill approved by the House
would bar production of tritium in commercial nuclear reactors.
The Senate-passed version of the bill was amended to permit DOE
to choose the long-term option as originally directed by
Congress. The Senate appropriated $177 million for the program,
with the added $20 million also going to accelerator research,
while the House appropriated $157 million, the DOE request
An interagency review of nuclear proliferation concerns
concluded that the APT option poses none while those associated
with the CLWR option are manageable.. A Congressional Budget
Office report concluded that the APT would be much more costly
than the CLWR option over the 40-year life of the project,
largely because of the difference in operating costs.
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The House-passed FY1999 defense authorization bill,
contains an amendment that would bar the use of commercial
nuclear reactors for producing tritium to be used in the nuclear
weapons program. The Senate-passed bill contains an amendment
that would allow the Department of Energy (DOE) to make the
decision about a long-term tritium production option. DOE issued
a report of an interagency review of the nuclear proliferation
policy issues accompanying the tritium production options. The
review concluded that the accelerator (APT) option posed no
significant issues, and the commercial light water reactor (CLWR)
option issues were manageable. A Congressional Budget Office
report on the budgetary effects of the two options stated that
the APT option would be much more costly than either of the two
CLWR options.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Tritium is a crucial component of thermonuclear weapons.
Tritium gas is used in every U.S. nuclear warhead to enhance its
explosive yield. A typical thermonuclear device consists of two
stages, a primary where the explosion is initiated, and a
secondary where the main thermonuclear explosion takes place. The
yield of the primary stage, and its effectiveness in driving the
secondary to explode, is increased (boosted) by tritium gas which
undergoes a nuclear fusion reaction with deuterium, and generates
a large amount of neutrons to 'boost' the nuclear burn up of the
plutonium or highly enriched uranium.
Tritium is radioactive and has a relatively short half-life of
a little over 12 years. As a result, the supply of tritium in a
newly manufactured weapon would decay by 5.5% per year to less
than 1% of its original amount in seven half-lives or 87 years
without replenishment. In the past, tritium for replenishment in
existing weapons was produced in a nuclear reactor, called the K
reactor, at the DOE Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina.
In 1988, the reactor was shut down for safety reasons, and no
additional tritium has been produced in the U.S. for weapons
purposes. Replenishment of tritium in the stockpile has
continued, however, by recycling tritium from existing nuclear
weapons as they are dismantled. In 1991, President Bush signed
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) which committed
the major nuclear powers to a large reduction in their nuclear
weapons stockpiles. As a result of this reduction, the
stockpile's tritium levels have been maintained primarily by
recycling the tritium from deactivated warheads without new
tritium production.
By 1993, based on the annually updated Nuclear Weapons
Stockpile Plan (NWSP), DOE and DOD determined that tritium
production would need to be resumed by the year 2011 if the
United States were to maintain its weapons stockpile at the
levels set by START II. The NWSP is the blueprint by which DOE
proposes to manage the nation's nuclear weapon's stockpile in the
absence of testing. Because of the long lead time required to set
up a tritium production facility, it was realized that
development of preferred production options begin immediately. In
the 1996-2001 NWSP, the President directed DOE to fully support
the higher START I nuclear weapons level until START II is
ratified by all parties and implemented. The United States Senate
gave its advice and consent to ratify the treaty in January 1996
but Russia has not done so, and has no plans to in the
foreseeable future. The START I level requires that new tritium
production begin in the year 2005.
Tritium is a radioactive form, isotope, of hydrogen. Tritium
atoms have a half-life of 12.43 years. When tritium undergoes
radioactive decay, it converts to a stable, non-radioactive form,
isotope, of helium, helium-3. The half-life is the time it takes
for half of a given number of radioactive nuclei to be converted
to helium-3.
Although tritium occurs naturally in the environment, the
amount is too small for practical recovery. Therefore tritium for
nuclear weapons must be produced artificially. There are two ways
of producing tritium, both involving nuclear reactions using
neutrons. In the first way, neutrons are made to strike a target
consisting of a lithium/aluminum material. The neutrons react
with the lithium, producing tritium and other byproducts. This
technology has been used to produce tritium for several decades
at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. In the second
method, neutrons react with helium-3 to produce tritium and
normal hydrogen as by-products. Although this process has been
demonstrated, the helium-3 method has not yet been used in any
tritium production system.
The production of tritium requires the generation of energetic
neutrons. There are two suitable ways of producing such neutrons:
nuclear reactors and accelerators. In an accelerator, neutrons
are produced by a process called spallation. Protons, accelerated
in a particle accelerator to very high energies, strike a target
made of tungsten. The energetic protons then knock neutrons and
more protons off the tungsten atoms like billiard balls. These
neutrons and protons then knock off more neutrons in a cascade
fashion. In a nuclear reactor, energy is produced by nuclear
fission, or splitting, of uranium and plutonium atoms. Neutrons
are used to produce the fission in the first place, and a
byproduct of this reaction is more neutrons. Most of these
neutrons are used to create more fission reactions -- a chain
reaction -- but some neutrons leave the reaction region -- the
reactor core -- without initiating a fission reaction. These
neutrons are available for other nuclear reactions including
those that produce tritium. In both cases, the quantity of
neutrons produced can be controlled by adjusting parameters
inherent to the accelerator or nuclear reactor.
The responsibility of maintaining the country's nuclear
weapons stockpile is assigned to the Department of Energy (DOE).
The signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by
President Clinton on September 24, 1996, banning further testing
of nuclear weapons, contemplates that the U.S. nuclear weapon
stockpile is to be maintained primarily with a science based
approach using laboratory experiments and computer simulations.
Weapons activities fall within DOE's Office of Defense Programs
and consist of two major components: stockpile stewardship and
stockpile management. The first of these is charged with research
and development on ways to ensure the safety and reliability of
the existing stockpile, and to preserve a core of weapons-related
technical and scientific expertise. The stockpile management
component is responsible for stockpile surveillance activities --
those activities designed to ensure the safety, reliability and
performance of the existing stockpile, including remanufacture of
existing weapons, and for all tasks related to the production of
nuclear weapons. Tritium activities lie within the stockpile
management program.
Historically tritium was produced at the K Reactor and other
reactors at the Savannah River Site (SRS). As the reactors were
shut down, tritium production declined and halted altogether in
1988 when the K Reactor was shut down for safety upgrades. In the
same year, DOE started the New Production Reactor (NPR) project
to develop a long term source of tritium to replace the aging K
Reactor. In September 1992, the Bush Administration, under
pressure from Congress and citing reduced tritium demands,
decided to defer any further work on the NPR until 1995 and
stopped all the reactor design efforts. With the signing of START
II by President Bush in 1993, the number of active nuclear
warheads and the need for tritium were dramatically reduced. At
that time, the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOE concluded that
recycling the existing tritium from the deactivated warheads
could supply the needed tritium until a new source was ready.
By 1993 DOD and DOE both declared that due to the long lead
time for construction of a new source and the depletion of
tritium by radioactive decay, a tritium production development
program must be started immediately. During the FY1993 budget
process, Congress directed DOE to prepare and submit a report on
tritium supplies and the necessary schedule to resume tritium
production. Again in the FY1994 Defense Authorization Act,
Congress directed DOE to study tritium production and identify
the selected technology by March 1995. In March 1995 DOE released
a draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS)
although it did not, at that time, make a decision on the
selected technology. In October 1995 DOE issued its final PEIS.
Based on the analysis of the PEIS and other considerations, on
December 6, 1995 the DOE issued the Record of Decision, Tritium
Supply and Recycling Facilities, which committed DOE to pursue a
dual track strategy to ensure an adequate tritium production
capability. The dual track approach (1) initiates the purchase of
an existing commercial reactor or the lease of irradiation
services from an existing reactor with an option to purchase the
reactor and convert it to a defense facility; and (2) initiates
design, construction and testing of critical components of an
accelerator system for tritium production (called Accelerator
Production of Tritium or APT). Currently, DOE is to decide by
December 1998, which of these two tracks will serve as the
primary long-term tritium source.
According to DOE, the reactor approach would be available by
2005 while the accelerator would be operational by 2007. The
Savannah River Site (SRS) is to be the location for an
accelerator, should one be built. Furthermore, the tritium
recycling facility at SRS will be upgraded and consolidated to
support both options. On September 5, 1996, the Secretary of
Energy selected Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc., to demonstrate
the APT concept at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and to design
the accelerator at the SRS site.
On February 7, 1997, DOE selected the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
of the Tennessee Valley Authority, on a sole-source contract, for
the commercial reactor test. This plant has been operating for
less than a year. The purpose of the test is to demonstrate that
tritium can be produced in the plant's fuel assembly without
affecting the plant's operation. On August 11, 1997, the NRC held
a public meeting in Oak Ridge to discuss the Watts Bar proposal.
About 100 people attended, all of whom opposed the proposal. On
September 15, 1997, the NRC granted its approval to the project.
During the most recent refueling, which was completed on October
16, 1997, 32 of the neutron absorber rods were replaced by rods
containing lithium. When this fuel cycle is complete in about 18
months, those rods will be removed and the tritium formed by the
reaction of the reactor's neutrons with the lithium will be
removed. About one ounce (29 grams) of tritium is expected. None
of that tritium will be used in a nuclear weapon. The cost to DOE
for this experiment is $7.5 million.
On June 4, 1997, DOE issued a request for proposals for a
fixed-price contract to provide a commercial reactor for sale or
lease for production of tritium. Only pressurized water reactors
with a heat rate of 2400 megawatts or more and which will be
operating at full power by 2003 are being considered. Both TVA
and the Southern Company have submitted bids. The TVA bid
originally included two options. One is to use the existing Watts
Bar and Sequoyah plants and the other is to use its uncompleted
Bellefonte plant plus the existing plants as needed. The latter
option would require government assistance for completion of the
Bellefonte plant for its use as a tritium source at an estimated
to cost of about $2 billion. Operation costs for tritium
production from that plant are estimated at $100 million per
year. If the Bellefonte plant were to be selected, DOE would also
receive revenue from the sale of electricity. DOE estimates that
such payments could amount to a significant portion of the $2
billion. The Southern Company bid offers the Vogtle plant located
near Atlanta.
DOE was directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY1999 to decide on which of the two light water reactor options
-- purchase of a reactor or purchase of radiation services -- it
prefers by March 1, 1998. That decision, however, has not yet
been made. Recently, TVA decided to make the Bellefonte option
its prime offer to DOE. Included within that offer is that DOE
would share in the electricity revenues from a completed plant,
and that those revenues would be sufficient to pay back the $2
billion over the plant's life.
At the time of the 1993 decision to pursue a new long-term
tritium source, the target date its completion was set by START
II requirements, the year 2011. With the shortening of the
schedule as a result of the President's decision to use the START
I stockpile numbers, DOE announced that an interim tritium source
might be necessary if the accelerator option is selected. In
1997, DOE announced that it will reconsider using the Fast Flux
Test Facility (FFTF) at Hanford as a back-up source for tritium
production. In particular, the facility will remain open for at
least 2 more years in a "hot standby" mode. In other
words, it will be capable of starting up without the need to
re-fuel. The FFTF had been scheduled for shutdown, but recent
reports by an independent study group, JASON indicated that the
reactor could be used for interim production of tritium over the
period 2006 to 2016.
For FY1999, DOE is requesting $157 million for the tritium
source program, a reduction of about 40% from the FY1998
appropriation. The budget justification notes that DOE must
decide by December 1998 which option it will pursue. Since that
decision is not known at this time, DOE states that it is unable
to allocate the request to any specific projects. Such an
allocation will be made after the decision is made. Further, DOE
states that if the accelerator option is chosen, it will either
seek relief from the current deadline for beginning tritium
production or ask for additional funding. In a related item, DOE
is requesting about $30 million in its Nuclear Energy R& D
program for the FFTF. DOE has decided to make this program
responsible for that facility until a decision can be made on
whether to use it for an interim tritium source. DOE is also
completing a senior level policy review on the production of
tritium as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY1998, which it must deliver to Congress at least 30 days prior
to making a decision on a long-term source.
On June 25, 1998, the Senate passed the Defense Department,
FY1999 Authorization Bill, S.
2057, which authorizes $217 million for tritium production
for FY1999. The $60 million increase from the requested amount is
to be directed at research for the accelerator option. The Senate
stated that the DOE request was not credible and would not be
sufficient to continue evaluation of the two options. The Senate
also reminded DOE about the need to complete the senior level
policy review on tritium production. The Senate expressed concern
about the consequences of the light water reaction option for
nuclear proliferation. It noted the U.S. policy of keeping
civilian and defense uses of nuclear energy separate, and stated
that a "full and open debate" on the proliferation
issue was necessary before any changes in that policy would be
contemplated. The Senate adopted an amendment that would allow
DOE to complete its dual-track program to select a long-term
option for tritium production. The amendment supports the DOE's
authority to produce tritium in a commercial reactor if that is
the choice.
On May 21, 1998, the House passed its version of the FY1999
defense authorization bill. The bill authorizes a $30 million
increase in the DOE tritium production budget, all of it to
support additional design work on the APT option. The House feels
that DOE is not providing adequate funding for that option, on
which work will continue even if it is not selected as the
primary long-term option. The bill also contains a provision that
would require a report from DOE on the Watts Bar test currently
underway. Further, the provision would delay the decision on the
choice for long-term technology until December 31, 1999 until
after the completion of the Watts Bar tests and the delivery of
the report to Congress. An amendment introduced on the House
floor and adopted by the House, however, would prohibit the
production in a commercial nuclear reactor of tritium for nuclear
weapons. This provision would eliminate the CLWR option, making
the accelerator production of tritium the technology choice for
the long-term tritium source by default. The provisions in the
bill about delaying the decision for one year, of course, would
become moot.
On June 18, 1998, the Senate passed the Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Bill, 1999, (S.
2138), which appropriated $177 million for the DOE tritium
production program. The increase of $20 million above the request
is to be applied to the APT option for design work on the
accelerator. The Senate expressed its concern that the DOE
request was insufficient to ensure that the accelerator would
serve as a back-up option should the CLWR option be selected as
the primary long-term source. No mention was made in the report
accompanying the bill (S.Rept.
105-206) of the House action to ban the CLWR option as a
tritium production source.
On June 22, 1998, the House passed its version of the Energy
and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 1999, (H.R.
4060, H.Rept.
105-581), which appropriates $157 million, the DOE request,
for the program. No mention was made of the ban on the CLWR
option approved in the House defense authorization bill.
The principal controversy about the DOE tritium production
program concerns the choice of technology. Before the Record of
Decision there were some indications that DOE had already decided
upon accelerator production of tritium (APT) as the primary
choice. Several reasons were behind this decision including a
desire to continue operation of the linear accelerator facility
at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) where much of
the development work for the APT targets would take place. In
addition, concerns about the need to construct a new nuclear
reactor probably contributed to the decision. Congressional
action (primarily a task force set up by the Speaker -- see
below), however, caused DOE to reconsider and to add the existing
commercial reactor option when the Record of Decision was issued.
The action by the House that would prohibit the production of
tritium in a commercial reactor, however, could put an end to
this controversy. The Senate did not adopt a similar provision,
however, but chose to reaffirm DOE's authority to make the choice
of technology including the possibility of the CLWR. DOE also
does not support the House provision and argues that the decision
should not be made until it can report on the results of its
review of the options.
Target Date. Although current policy is set to meet the
2005 target for a new tritium production source, there are those
who believe that completion of that source can be extended well
beyond that deadline. If and when START II is ratified by Russia,
the need for new tritium production would be delayed to 2011
because the number of strategic warheads allowed in the stockpile
would be much lower than the START I limits defining the 2005
target. The START II calls for a stockpile of 3,500 nuclear
strategic warheads.
Many argue that further nuclear weapons reduction beyond the
START II limits is possible with the result that additional years
would be available to recycle tritium from dismantled warheads
because the tritium production schedule included an additional
5-year reserve. Recently a number of nuclear arms control
advocates have argued for further reductions to around 1,000
deployed warheads. In that case, the need for new tritium
production could be pushed back to the year 2035 by the recycling
of the tritium from the deactivated warheads. In December 1996
retired Air Force General George Lee Butler, former Commander in
Chief of Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), together with retired
General Andrew J. Goodpaster and 60 other generals and admirals
around the world, called for additional reduction in nuclear arms
and the phased elimination, with verification, of all nuclear
arms. The Administration, however, has rejected further
unilateral cuts in U.S. nuclear weapons until the Russians have
ratified START II. At this time, there have been no official
proposals, either from Congress or the Administration, for
additional nuclear weapons stockpile reductions. But more calls
for nuclear arms reduction, possibly leading to elimination of
nuclear arsenals, are likely in the next few years.
Interim Sources - Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF). If
there is no change in the current target date, however, then the
question of an interim source becomes important. One option is to
upgrade existing DOE reactors. Of the non-operational DOE
reactors, only one is capable of producing a significant amount
of tritium, the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) at the Hanford
Site.
A number of studies carried out for DOE showed that would be
not major technical barriers to using the FFTF for interim
tritium production (up to 10 years), and that conversion costs
would be about $37) million. In addition, the studies argued that
the FFTF could serve as a source of medical isotopes when it was
no longer needed to produce tritium. Opposition developed to the
proposal, however, from those who were concerned that restarting
the FFTF would compromise cleanup efforts at the Hanford site and
that it would require a significant quantity of plutonium or
highly enriched uranium. In addition, some raised potential
safety problems with restarting the FFTF, although DOE disputed
those claims.
DOE decided to place the FFTF on hot standby and continue to
explore the feasibility of using it for an interim source. For
FY1999, both the House and Senate appropriated $31.5 million to
maintain the FFTF in a hot stand-by mode pending any need to use
the reactor as an interim source. In a July 1998 report on
nuclear nonproliferation policy issues associated with tritium
production (see below), however, DOE appeared to conclude that
the FFTF would not be an appropriate option. DOE concluded that
if plutonium were to be used in the reactor, it soon would be
necessary to use plutonium "the President had declared to be
excess to defense needs and never to be used for nuclear
arms." The report further noted that using highly enriched
uranium would also be counter to current U.S. policy. As a result
it appears that the FFTF will no longer be considered an interim
option, although an official announcement to that effect has not
been made yet.
Long Term Sources. Neither of the two tracks being
considered by DOE for a long term source -- the commercial light
water reactor (CLWR) or the accelerator production of tritium
(APT) -- involves substantial technical risk. Commercial reactors
would be used to produce tritium by placing lithium-6 targets in
the neutron absorbing control rods within the reactor core. This
will require the redesign of the rods. This procedure is the
object of DOE-sponsored tests now underway. The tritium
production target rods can be removed at the same time the
reactor is refueled. The quantity of irradiation services can be
scaled according to the amount of tritium needed for the
stockpile. If one reactor were used, the amount of tritium
required by the START I levels would require a shorter fuel cycle
than the current 18 months because of the buildup of helium gas
in the rods. That situation would add to the radiation service
costs, so two reactors are likely to be used under START I
tritium production requirements. In addition, additional
facilities would be required to extract the tritium for use in
weapons. The impact on electricity power production should be
minimal.
The test of this process at Watts Bar has been underway for
several months. There have been no indications of any problems to
this point. Target rod development thus far has demonstrated
feasibility, but development and qualification have not yet been
completed.
A potential concern with this option is that a commercial
reactor would not be under the control of DOE. It is possible
that future changes in the electric utility industry could cause
the utility owner/operator to decide that the reactor was no
longer economic to operate. If DOE had to take over the reactor
at that point and could not obtain a "subsidy" from the
sale of electric power from the plant, its operational costs
might suddenly grow substantially. This situation might be of
particular concern if the Bellefonte option is selected. Part of
the reason for choosing that course would be the possibility of
recovering a significant share of the original costs through
revenues from the sale of electricity. If the electricity market
did not permit sales at prices that would allow the reactor to
run economically, DOE would not receive its expected revenues. In
addition, there are potential regulatory and environmental
problems that could arise in the option. These issues are
discussed in more detail below.
The purchase of a commercial nuclear reactor by DOE would
eliminate potential uncertainties connected with the utility
owner/operator. Most of the existing commercial nuclear reactors,
however, are in the middle or tail-end of their designed
life-cycle. The conversion of a commercial reactor for the 40
years of tritium production may require substantial investment in
upgrading the facility as well as insuring the safety of the
reactor. The purchase of a partially completed reactor might be
preferred, depending on the cost for completion. The cost of
decommissioning the reactor at the end of the tritium production
life-cycle is uncertain, but is likely to be high based on
current experience. There also would be regulatory, environmental
and non-proliferation issues as discussed below.
The second option in DOE's dual track approach, accelerator
production of tritium (APT), is a significant departure from
previous approaches. Existing DOE particle accelerators are
capable of producing only a small amount of tritium. The research
accelerators were designed for pulsed, and not continuous,
operation at low power levels (about 800 KW). A production
accelerator would be required to deliver a high power proton beam
at 100 MW, or more than two orders of magnitude greater. While
the APT process has yet to be demonstrated on anything
approaching the scale required for the stockpile, research and
development is being conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) to demonstrate its feasibility. Several subsystems
including a prototype of the superconducting RF cavity that will
provide the proton acceleration are under construction. Early
results in the development of the initial stages of the
acceleratory have been promising. Also, prototypes of the RF
power supplies that will drive the cavities have been operating
continuously for and extended period building confidence in the
ability of the accelerator to run steady state. The accelerator
facility which is part of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center,
is being used for this R& D. In addition, DOE started
preliminary -- Title I -- design of a full scale APT facility in
October 1997.
There are several potential advantages of APT. It does not
create high-level nuclear waste, and safety concerns are not a
major problem since it does not use fissionable material. The
quantity of tritium to be produced can be adjusted by the
schedule of operation. In addition, the accelerator could be
available for scientific experiments and possibly production of
medical isotopes since tritium production is not likely to demand
all of its time. A major disadvantage is that the APT would
require a substantial amount of electrical power to produce the
high energy proton beam. A machine to reach tritium production
required by START I levels will require 450 MW while an
accelerator designed for START II levels (see below) will require
385 MW. The proposed accelerator at SRS is approximately 0.7 mile
long, and is a part of the APT complex covering approximately 173
acres of land. In its current long term budget outlook for
stockpile management (1997-2010), DOE assumes that the ATP option
will be selected.
Costs. The most contentious issues is the cost
difference between the two options. Supporters of the CLWR option
argue that it is significantly less costly than the APT option.
Supporters of that option, however, claim the cost estimates made
to date grossly overstate the cost differences and that the two
options are comparable. For the CLWR option, DOE currently
estimates a capital cost of $1.8 to $2 billion to complete
Bellefonte and operating costs of about $28 million per year over
its 40-year life. It also assumes that revenues from the sale of
electricity will offset a substantial portion of the operating
costs. Some in the DOE CLWR office believe that electricity
revenues could even offset a significant portion of the capital
cost, although DOE has not taken an official position on that
claim. Purchase of radiation services from a completed reactor
would probably be substantially less in capital cost terms than
the Bellefonte option, but might result in a higher total time if
TVA's estimates on electricity revenues are accurate. The CLWR
project funding requirements to the start of operation are
estimated at $613 million to FY2005 not counting costs to
complete Bellefonte or purchase services on an existing reactor.
Those funds include manufacture and irradiation of the first
array of absorber rods producing tritium, start up of the tritium
extraction facility, and delivery of the first unit of tritium
gas. The APT option is now estimated by DOE to be $3.9 billion to
complete with $149 million in annual operating costs over 40
years for a START I-level machine.
Recently, an effort led by Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) reported a plan to reduce the cost of the APT facility by
using a modular design. This approach would result in a first
stage costing about $3 billion compared to the DOE estimate for
the entire machine of $3.9 billion. The first stage, however,
would be capable of producing enough tritium to meet START II
demands but would be below the START I stockpile requirements.
Because of the modular design, however, additions to the
accelerator of any size could be added once the basic unit is
completed. While DOE has expressed interest in this approach, it
has not committed to a modular design. One concern is that the
eventual cost of such an approach may be significantly higher
than building the entire unit at once if the current design
production level -- set by START I -- is needed.
Researchers at LANL also believe the cost of the machine can
be reduced considerably no matter what the tritium production
target. They estimate that in the best case, a machine capable of
reaching START I levels would cost about $2.7 to $3 billion and a
START II machine would cost about $2.1 to $2.6 billion. Lower
construction costs and a reduced contingency fund are expected to
be the major sources of the lower costs.
If those costs are achievable, the capital cost difference
between the APT and CLWR options -- assuming the Bellefonte
approach is taken -- would be much smaller than now appears to be
the case, and the two options would seem to be fairly competitive
that basis. Operating costs, however, could still be
substantially different, primarily because of the large
electricity costs of operating the APT.
One factor affecting the capital cost difference is likely to
be the size of the revenues DOE would receive from the sale of
electricity in the CLWR option that included the completion of
the Bellefonte plant. With the possibility of electricity rates
declining over the next several years due to increased
competition in the electric utility industry, the likelihood that
a completed Bellefonte would be able to sell electricity at a
price high enough for DOE to recover all or part of its $2
billion investment is uncertain. It is more likely that such
revenues will be able to offset part of the operating costs. In
any event, the extent of those revenues will go a long way in
determining whether DOE chooses the Bellefonte option.
An additional factor is the reliability of the capital cost
estimates to complete Bellefonte of the APT facility. The
Bellefonte plant consists of two units, one 60% complete and the
other 90% complete according to TVA, and no work has been done on
these plants for several years. While those percentages suggest
that most of the plant cost has been spent, that might not be the
case. The history of nuclear power construction in the United
States has been replete with large cost overruns, much of which
has occurred when a plant was near completion. Furthermore, in
1994, Southern Company estimated completion costs for Bellefonte
at $2.5 to $4.5 billion. The recent APT estimates may also be
low. DOE has a recent history of cost overruns on major projects,
although there are some notable exceptions. The existence of
those overruns, however, has forced DOE to be extra cautious
about making project cost estimates. It has included a 20%
contingency factor which is typical of the overruns experienced
by DOE on previous accelerator projects. Nevertheless, an
accelerator with the requirements of the APT has never been built
before, and even though much of the technology has been used
elsewhere, the risk of a significant cost escalation once
engineering design proceeds remains.
A cost analysis of the two options -- including both cases of
the CLWR option -- was recently completed by the Congressional
Budget Office. The CBO cost estimates are summarized in the
following table reproduced from the CBO report. All costs are
reported in billions of constant 1999 dollars and are derived
from DOE supplied data.
Table 1. Cost Analysis
(In billions of dollars)
| Option |
Design
and Construction Costs |
40-year
Operating Costs |
40-year
Offsetting Receipts |
Total
Costs |
| APT |
3.93 |
6.18 |
0.59 |
9.52 |
| CLWR/Bellefonte |
2.59 |
1.12 |
1.20 |
2.51 |
| CLWR/irradiation
services |
0.46 |
1.32 |
0 |
1.78 |
Offsetting receipts are a result of sale of medical isotopes
(see below) in the case of the APT and revenues from the sale of
electricity in the case of the CLWR/Bellefonte option. Design and
construction costs include facilities for producing and
extracting tritium.
As can be inferred from above, however, the APT project office
at LANL disputes some of the CBO estimates. In particular, LANL
countered that the design and construction cost should be $3.3
billion including a contingency fee of $511 million compared to
CBO's estimate of $750 million. Further, LANL states that if the
funding process used for the APT is changed from incremental
funding -- appropriations as needed -- to that assumed for
Bellefonte -- block funding -- the APT cost would drop to $3
billion, the figure cited above. While those changes would make
the cost of the APT and CLWR/Bellefonte option closer together,
there remains a substantial difference in the operating costs,
even if the electricity revenues assumed by DOE do not
materialize. By far the major reason for that difference is the
cost of electricity to operate the APT.
The CBO report also points out the large first-cost difference
between the two CLWR sub-options. In performing their analysis,
CBO assumed that two reactors would be needed for purchasing
irradiation services from existing reactors while only the
Bellefonte reactor would be needed if completion of that plant is
selected as the CLWR option. The net operating costs would be
much higher for irradiation services because there would be no
revenues from the sale of electricity. Nevertheless, it appears
to be a lower cost option that completing Bellefonte. Further,
the risk of substantial cost increases would seem to be much less
because of the possibility of significant cost overruns when
completing Bellefonte.
The possibility of producing medical isotopes in the APT
accelerator has raised the possibility of generating offsetting
revenues for that option from the sale of such isotopes. A group
of medical researchers held a workshop held in May about using
the ATP for the production of radionuclides for medical purposes.
The workshop participants concluded that the APT facility could
be a major source of such radionuclides resulting in substantial
biomedical research opportunities. The large target volume and
high beam power of the facility would be major reasons for the
large medical isotope production potential. Additional costs
would be incurred with it this capability is added, however, to
modify the target area and build the infrastructure needed to
extract and process the medical isotopes. Officials from LANL
have concluded that using the APT for this purpose would only
reduce tritium output by about 1%.
The amount of revenues from this option would depend heavily
on the success of many of the radionuclide therapies and
diagnostic techniques reported on at the May workshop, which are
now in the research stage. For the purposes of its analysis, the
CBO assumed a revenue stream of about $15 million per year. The
market is highly uncertain, however, and could be much greater if
a significant portion of the research reported on is successful.
DOE appears interested in this option, but has not put any funds
into develop it further. While discussions have taken place with
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) about this possibility,
NIH has been noncommital about providing any support at this
point.
Environmental and Safety Concerns. Important factors
influencing the decision about tritium production technology are
the potential impact of the candidate technologies on the
environment, and the safety level of the production facility.
Common to all the reactor options are concerns about reactor
safety and the generation and management of radioactive waste.
Since the early 1970s, no new commercial nuclear reactor has been
built in the United States. The major reasons have been the high
cost of nuclear power compared to other electric power generation
technologies, and the slowdown in the growth of electric power
demand which left substantial excess generation capacity. In
addition, there have been concerns about reactor safety. While
the U.S. nuclear power industry has a generally excellent safety
record and there is evidence of a substantial improvement in
power plant safety in the last several years, the memory of Three
Mile Island and foreign accidents has contributed to the
resistance of the public toward more nuclear power plants.
Finally, there are environmental concerns about the creation
and disposal of high level nuclear waste. The additional waste
produced by a production reactor would be quite small in
comparison to the waste already produced. Indeed, for a reactor
that was already in operation, the additional wastes due to
tritium production would be negligible. Nevertheless, the
difficulty in disposing of such waste remains and has contributed
to the resistance toward the CLWR option. The public is concerned
about the storage of nuclear wastes, and the high cost of cleanup
upon the decommissioning of the reactor in case of an accident.
The APT is not a reactor and would not generate any spent fuel
nor would there be any significant safety concerns. A DOE draft
environmental impact statement on the project states that the
impact would be "minor and consistent with what might be
expected for any industrial facility". Because nuclear
reactions would take place in the APT facility, some radioactive
waste material would result. It would be a small, however, and
all of it would be low level waste (waste whose radioactive
byproducts are low energy and far less dangerous than byproducts
from nuclear reactors). The principal environmental consequence
of an APT facility would likely be the large amount of electric
power which would be required. This power would very likely be
generated by the burning of fossil fuels which contribute to air
quality concerns and produce carbon dioxide. At this point,
however, DOE believes that existing electric power capacity in
the region where the accelerator would be located is capable of
supplying all of the APT needs.
Public concern about the reactor option was expressed at the
public meeting held by the NRC prior to approving the Watts Bar
test. At that meeting, many of those opposed were concerned about
the potential release of radioactive material in the Tennessee
River, and about how the insertion of the lithium rods would
affect the reactor's reliability. In general, however, public
concern about using a commercial reactor does not seem to be
extensive, and there appears to be significant, local support for
using a commercial reactor or completing the construction of the
Bellefonte plant.
Regulatory and Proliferation Concerns. Regulation is
also an issue for the choice of production technology since any
reactor option would be subjected to the current nuclear power
plant regulatory process. Presently commercial reactors are
licensed and regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC). The DOE assumes that an existing facility used to make
tritium for the department would remain licensed by the NRC, with
license amendments for insertion of tritium target absorber rods.
Even more extensive NRC licensing and regulatory process and
structure would be employed for the construction or completion of
a new reactor. In June 1996, DOE and NRC signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) concerning DOE's future use of NRC-regulated
facilities to produce tritium for nuclear weapons. The agreement
established a basis for NRC review and consultation on DOE's
possible purchase of commercial light water reactors or of
irradiation services from commercial reactors. This MOU will
smooth out some of the obstacles to the licensing of commercial
reactors for tritium production. For the APT option, the
accelerator would not have to undergo the same safety and
licensing process as a reactor.
As a result of a review of a DOE technical report on the
reactor option, the NRC announced that any utility seeking to
participate in the program will have to submit a license
amendment, specific to plant or plants in question, that
addresses all of the issues about tritium production. In
addition, the NRC stated that it would review possible accidents
that could arise from tritium production as to their
"consequences of off-site radiological releases" of
tritium, although it did not believe such consequences would be
significant. For the Watts Bar test described above, the NRC had
to give its approval to insert the lithium rods because that
constituted a modification of the original reactor license.
Another issue which has been raised is the possible nuclear
proliferation consequences of using civilian facilities for
weapons tritium production. The separation of civilian and
military use of atomic energy is a long-standing U.S. policy,
partly to protect against unauthorized use of weapons grade
nuclear materials. DOE has consistently pointed out, however,
that tritium is not considered a special nuclear material as
defined by the Atomic Energy Act, and, therefore, its production
in a civilian nuclear reactor would not compromise the separation
of civilian and military use of atomic energy. Nevertheless,
nuclear non-proliferation concerns, particularly for the CLWR
option, persisted. As a result, in the FY1998 Conference Report
to the FY1998 National Defense Authorization Act, the Congress
requested that DOE lead an interagency review of the nuclear
nonproliferation issues associated with tritium production. That
report was released on July 14, 1998.
The review concluded that the nonproliferation policy issues
connected with the CLWR option were "manageable." It
also concluded that the APT option "raised no significant
nonproliferation policy issues." In that review, DOE
concluded that existing law does not prohibit the production of
tritium to be used for nuclear weapons in commercial facilities.
In particular it stated that the provision in the Atomic Energy
Act that prohibits the production of special nuclear materials in
commercial facilities for "nuclear explosive purposes"
is not applicable in this case because tritium is not a special
nuclear material but rather a byproduct material as defined by
the Act. DOE also argued that the practice of separating civil
and defense nuclear facilities has not been absolute. It cited
the Hanford N Reactor, used to produce plutonium for weapons,
which also generated steam that was used for the commercial
production of electricity. Finally, the review concluded that
international treaty does not prohibit tritium production in a
nuclear reactor. The inspections provision of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the U.S. voluntarily adheres to,
has only been applied to materials that can be used directly in
nuclear weapons or transformed into such materials. It has not
been applied to tritium and the International Atomic Energy
Authority, whcih administers the inspections, has stated that it
will not include tritium in the future.
The review also concluded that a number of mitigating factors
existed to reduce any proliferation danger from producing tritium
in commercial reactors. Among these are that TVA, which is the
sole organization interested in supplying the CLWR option is TVA,
is an instrumentality of the U.S. government, and use of TVA
reactors would be extending a long practice of using
government-owned facilities for both civilian and defense
purposes. In addition, any reactor used in the production of
tritium would be fueled with low enriched uranium fuel.
The review concluded that APT option would not pose any
significant proliferation potential. It was noted, however, that
because the accelerator would involve technology capable of
producing special nuclear materials, export of any of those
technologies would be controlled under relevant federal
regulations. Finally, as noted above, the review concluded that
the Fast Flux Test Reactor would be an undesirable option from a
proliferation perspective.
Despite this review, opposition is to the CLWR option is
likely to remain and could intensify as DOE's decision on a
commercial reactor for a tritium source nears, although according
to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) the production of
tritium in a commercial reactor is not a proliferation issue. The
principal source of that concern, wwhich was not addressed in the
review, is that the use of civilian nuclear reactors for the
production of weapons material may set a bad precedent. While
there might be no legal prohibitions against producing tritium
for weapons use in a commercial facility, doing so might make
other nations believe that the United States was not serious
about nuclear non-proliferation and take steps to use their own
commercial facilities for weapons purposes.
That concern received the most attention at the NRC public
meeting on the Watts Bar test. Opponents argued that once Watts
Bar is operating with the lithium rods and is producing tritium
for later extraction, it becomes a "bomb plant."
Although DOE officials pointed out that tritium has other
purposes besides its use in nuclear weapons, is not a special
nuclear material, and is not covered by the Atomic Energy Act,
opponents pointed out that the sole purpose of the test is to
demonstrate the feasibility of producing tritium for nuclear
weapons. They noted that Egyptian officials had cited the Watts
Bar experiment in that country's decision to proceed with
construction of another nuclear power plant. Therefore, while the
letter of the law is met, the spirit of the law is not according
to these opponents.
Again, an APT facility would not have this perception concern
because the accelerator would be a dedicated defense facility in
its tritium production mode. If also used for scientific
research, however, it is possible that such concerns would be
raised, particularly to the degree there was international access
to the technology used in the accelerator.
Proliferation concerns prompted the amendment to the FY1999
defense authorization bill adopted by the House that bars the use
of commercial nuclear reactors from producing tritium for use in
nuclear weapons. The supporters argued that adopting the CLWR
option would give the wrong message to potential and emerging
nuclear states about the use of commercial nuclear facilities for
defense purposes. DOE and countered that it should be allowed to
complete its analysis of the issue before a decision on whether
to use commercial facilities for tritium production was made.
Congressional opponents of the amendment argued that it would
force the choice of the potentially more costly accelerator
option prior to DOE's input and without significant congressional
debate. The Senate's version of the bill, on the other hand,
implicitly supports the concept of production of tritium in a
commercial reactor with the amendment reaffirming DOE's role in
making the technology choice. The Senate, however, does express
proliferation concern about the CLWR option.
Schedule. The first step in the process is the
selection of a long term tritium source option. Currently, DOE
has scheduled this decision for late in 1998. In the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY1998 and 1999, Congress directed
DOE to make the final decision on choice of technologies to be
used for long term tritium production no later than December 31,
1998. There are those in Congress, however, that argue DOE can
and should make this decision sooner if the production targets
are to be met. The original target date set by Congress was April
15, 1997. The House National Security Committee version of the
FY1999 defense authorization bill, however, would delay that
decision another year. Because there is no comparable provision
in the Senate Armed Services Committee version, it is likely that
the fate of that provision will not be known for several weeks at
best. In the meantime, there is the possibility that DOE will
make the decision sooner. The pending departure of the current
Secretary of Energy by June 30, 1998, could be preceded by his
announcement of the choice of preferred long-term production
technology.
As for meeting the production target date, DOE argues that the
two options being considered have high probability of meeting the
2011 date originally set by START II weapon levels. The APT
facility, however, would not be available until 2007 and could
not meet a 2005 deadline imposed by START I. The quickest way to
secure a long term source, therefore, appears to be purchase of
irradiation services from the civilian nuclear power industry, in
which case the production of tritium could occur as early as
2004. The purchase of an existing or partially completed
commercial reactor could result in tritium production by the year
2005 after the target development and construction of a tritium
extraction facility. Except for the existing reactor option
(including purchase of radiation services), an interim source
would be needed to meet the 2005 deadline.
These schedule assessments are based on the assumption that
everything would go smoothly, including construction of new
reactor, completion of a partially competed reactor, or
construction of an accelerator; contract negotiation in the case
of the existing commercial reactor; regulatory review and
licensing; and environmental impacts analysis. There are those
who feel that DOE is not proceeding quickly enough to meet the
shorter deadline. In particular they are concerned that DOE has
not adequately accounted for the environmental, regulatory,
proliferation and costs uncertainties as discussed above. The
Congress expressed this concern in the Conference Report of the
FY1997 Defense Authorization Bill. A report from the House
National Security Committee also stated that DOE is not moving
fast enough to make the decisions needed to ensure a tritium
production capability when needed. In particular it criticized
DOE for not providing adequate funding for the program. The DOE,
however, feels that its stockpile management program will be able
to meet its objectives.
LEGISLATION
H.R.
3616 (Spence) National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1999. A bill to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 1999 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal
year 1999, and for other purposes. Reported to House (amended) by
Committee on National Security May 12, 1998 (H.Rept.
105-532). Passed House, amended, May 21, 1998.
S.
2057/S.
2060 (Thurmond) National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1999. An original bill to authorize
appropriations for FY1999 for military activities of the
Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel
strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for
other purposes. Reported by Committee on Armed Services May 11,
1998 (S.Rept.
105-189 accompanying S.
2060). Passed Senate, amended, June 25, 1998.
S.
2138 (Domenici)/H.R.
4060 (McDade) Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act, 1999. Senate Committee on Appropriations
reported an original measure June 5, 1998 (S.Rept.
105-206). Passed Senate, amended, June 18, 1998. House
Committee on Appropriations reported an original measure June 16,
1998 (H.Rept.
105-581). Passed House, amended, June 22, 1998.
CBO Document. Estimated Budgetary Effects of Alternatives
for Producing Tritium. Congressional Budget Office. August
1998.
CRS Reports
CRS Report 96-11. Nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship:
Alternatives for Congress, by Jonathan Medalia.
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