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IB96037: Congo (formerly Zaire) Raymond W. Copson January 19, 2001 CONTENTS
The Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire, is a vast-resource-rich country of 48 million people. Events there affect much of sub-Saharan Africa. In August 1998, Congo was plunged into its second civil war in 2 years. A peace accord was concluded in Lusaka, Zambia, in July and August 1999, and the U.N. Security Council later agreed to send a 5,500-member observer force, MONUC, to assist in the peace process. Fewer than 250 observers have gone to Congo, due to the failure of the parties to the Lusaka accord to fully implement its terms. The assassination of President Laurent Kabila on January 16, 2001, has raised new doubts about the prospects for peace in Congo. The rebellion is rooted in ethnic and political unrest in eastern Congo, where guerrillas seeking the overthrow of the governments of Rwanda and Uganda are based. In response, both countries have sent troops into Congo to support different rebel factions. Some reports indicate that interests in both countries are exploiting Congo's rich resources of timber, gold, and diamonds. Many Congolese view the conflict as essentially an invasion by Rwanda-based Tutsi, who are unpopular. Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe has deployed more than 11,000 troops to back the Congo government, and reports allege that Zimbabwe interests are also profiting from Congo's resources. Angola has also intervened on behalf of the regime, evidently in the hope that this will help prevent UNITA, the Angolan armed opposition movement, from using bases in Congo. Foreign intervention in Congo has provoked fears of a wider conflict. South Africa and Zambia have led mediation efforts among the governments involved. The 1996-1997 rebellion was launched in eastern Zaire by local Tutsi known as Banyamulenge, but won broad support due to high levels of poverty and unemployment. At that time, Rwanda, which had suffered an anti-Tutsi genocide in 1994, supported Kabila, then a rebel leader, and broke up large Hutu refugee camps in eastern Zaire. These camps had been sheltering Hutu militants who were staging incursions into Rwanda. Kabila took power in May 1997, and suspended the activities of all political parties, except for his Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL). Human rights activists maintain that he suppressed dissent in an attempt to hold onto power indefinitely. President Kabila showed considerable distrust of the western donor community, which has pressed for democratization, and this sharply limited aid inflows. Ousted President Mobutu Sese Seko, who died in September 1997, left Congo with a $14 billion foreign debt. Congo was ill-prepared for independence in 1960; its first civil war broke out almost immediately, leading to U.N. intervention. U.S. policy-makers took a strong interest in Zaire during the Cold War years because of its resources and central location, but relations with Mobutu cooled in the post-Cold War era. Policy makers initially welcomed Kabila's pledge of elections in 2 years, but problems in democratization and economic reform complicated relations. A limited aid program focusing on democracy, health, the private sector, and the environment had been resumed before the latest outbreak of conflict. Clinton Administration officials strongly backed the Lusaka accord. On January 18, 2001, the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) announced that President Laurent Kabila had died. The statement added that he had left a testament to the army to "flush the aggressors out of the country." Kabila had been shot on Tuesday, January 16, 2001, and numerous reliable reports indicated that he had died shortly thereafter. Many analysts suspected government claims that Kabila remained alive were a smokescreen, masking a power struggle or efforts to secure the loyalty of the armed forces before the death was acknowledged. On January 17, the government announced that Kabila's son Joseph, 31 years old and commander of the armed forces, had been placed in charge. Theories on responsibility for Kabila's assassination abounded. Some Congolese officials blamed a disgruntled bodyguard, allegedly acting alone; others speculated that top generals had killed Kabila, because they were dissatisfied either by his failure to prosecute the civil war effectively or by his failure to implement the 1999 Lusaka peace accord. Many questioned whether Angola and perhaps Zimbabwe, Kabila's principal external supporters, might have had foreknowledge of the killing. Others suspected rebel groups or Uganda and Rwanda, which back them. The Clinton Administration's ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke, warned on January 17 that "It is essential for the foreign forces who have invaded and occupy large parts of the Congo halt their offensive action. They should not seek to take advantage of the events in Kinshasa to expand their presence. They should not play a role in the internal political process in Kinshasa." United Nations involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), formerly Zaire, is based on the 1999 Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement, which resulted from a peace initiative led by President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, acting on behalf of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). On July 10, 1999, at a summit in Lusaka, Zambia's capital, leaders of Congo, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Rwanda, and Uganda signed the agreement following difficult negotiations. Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe have troops in Congo supporting the government, while troops from Uganda and Rwanda support different rebel groups. The rebel groups in Congo did not sign the accord in July 1999 due to factional disputes, but following South African mediation, they finally accepted it on August 31, 1999. Those signing included Emile Ilunga, then leader of the main faction of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), which is backed by Rwanda and based in Goma in eastern Congo, and Wamba dia Wamba, head of a Uganda-backed RCD faction based in Bunia, close to the Ugandan border. Also signing was Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), a Uganda-backed rebel group active in the northwest. Lusaka Agreement Implementation Major aspects of the Lusaka accord have not been implemented, although there has been limited progress in some areas. Cease-fire. The Lusaka agreement called for a cease-fire within 24 hours, but there were many subsequent outbreaks of fighting punctuated by efforts by diplomats to establish a genuine halt to hostilities. On April 8, 2000, the Lusaka parties, meeting in Kampala, Uganda, agreed to a new cease-fire to take effect on April 14, but this was respected only briefly. As of December 2000, it appeared that recent fighting in the northwest, where the MLC had evidently been attempting to capture Mbandaka, a key Congo River port, had subsided. However, there was new fighting in Katanga Province, where the Goma-based RCD faction was making gains around Lake Mweru; and fighting between Goma-based RCD forces and militias supporting the government continued to take a heavy toll among civilians in eastern Congo. Nonetheless, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his December 6, 2000 report to the Security Council (S/2000/1156), said that there was "substantial compliance with the cease-fire in most parts" of the DRC. Zambian officials said on December 12, 2000, that they had disarmed more than 3,000 foreign soldiers who had fled a rebel advance in the southeastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Some Zimbabwe soldiers were reportedly among the troops who fled, and Rwanda claimed that large numbers of Hutu militants, who had been backing Congo's President Laurent Kabila, had crossed into Zambia as well. Joint Military Commission. The Lusaka accord called for the creation of a Joint Military Commission (JMC), including representatives of the signatories and a neutral chairman, within one week. The responsibilities of the commission were to include the investigation of cease-fire violations and the development of mechanisms to disarm militia groups in Congo. The convening of the JMC was initially delayed because the rebel groups could not agree on how they would be represented, but the commission finally held its first full meeting on October 11-12 in Kampala, Uganda, and on December 8, the JMC met in Lusaka and set up a number of committees. It has not yet managed to begin carrying out its assigned duties in part due to the unstable situation within the DRC. At a July 2000 JMC meeting in Lusaka, there were complaints that some countries had failed to meet their financial pledges to the JMC , hindering its operations. (The Clinton Administration's Ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke, said in December 1999 that the United States had contributed $1 million toward the expenses of the JMC). Unable to monitor the cease-fire, the JMC has focused on drawing up disengagement and redeployment plans for the Congo combatants. Withdrawal of Foreign Forces. Under the Lusaka agreement, all foreign forces, apart from peacekeepers, were to withdraw from Congo within nine months, according to a timetable to be worked out by the U.N., the OAU, and the JMC. For many months, there was no sign of progress on this aspect of the agreement, but in July 2000, Uganda began to bring home 3,000 to 4,000 troops that had been based in Kisangani. The withdrawal came after Rwanda and Uganda had mutually agreed to pull their forces out of Kisangani and may reflect growing dissatisfaction within Uganda with the costly Congo deployment. (See below, Foreign Involvement.) Both Uganda and Rwanda maintain that they have intervened in Congo to protect their countries from incursions by Congo-based rebel groups, and that they cannot withdraw until eastern Congo has been stabilized. On June 16, 2000, however, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1304, which demanded that Uganda and Rwanda withdraw all their forces from Congo "without further delay." At present, DRC armed forces do not appear capable of unilaterally expelling foreign forces, even with the help of allies, although periodic reports appear of large purchases of military equipment by the DRC and major recruitment drives. South African President Thabo Mbeki convened a regional mini-summit at Maputo, Mozambique, on October 16, 2000, and leaders of the DRC, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe agreed that armed forces in the DRC should begin to disengage in accordance with a plan agreed to at the April 8 Kampala meeting. Political Dialogue. Within 45 days, under the Lusaka agreement, the Congo government was to enter into a dialogue with the RCD and MLC, as well as domestic opposition groups and civil society, on the country's future. After six weeks of dialogue, there was to be agreement on new national political arrangements. The first sign of progress on the dialogue appeared on December 14, 1999, when the Congo parties agreed that the former president of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, should serve as a neutral facilitator. The Kabila government was soon accusing Masire of being biased against it, however, and in June 2000, it briefly sealed his office. In his December 6 report, Secretary General Annan noted that the regime was still refusing to accept Masire, although the rebel movements were willing to do so. Meanwhile, Kabila unilaterally appointed a "transition" parliament of 300 members, which convened on August 21 at Lubumbashi, capital of Katanga province. United Nations Force. According to the Lusaka agreement, the United Nations Security Council, in collaboration with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), was to deploy a large force to Congo in order to ensure implementation of the accord and provide humanitarian assistance to civilians. This did not happen initially because the United States and other likely sponsors of such a force were wary of a prolonged and expensive entanglement with an uncertain mandate. They were also concerned about the potential for violence, since the cease-fire was not being respected. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1258 of August 6, 1999, did authorize the deployment of 90 U.N. military liaison personnel for three months to assist the JMC and report back to the Secretary General on the situation. The operation thus created - and later expanded - is known as the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or by its French acronym as MONUC. In a January 17, 2000 report (S/2000/30), the Secretary General proposed expanding MONUC to a force of 5,537 personnel - consisting of 500 observers to be protected by the remainder of the force. On February 24, the Security Council endorsed this proposal in Resolution 1291 but emphasized that actual deployment would be based on the assumption that parties to the Lusaka accord respect the cease-fire. The resolution further stated that the force would be deployed only when the Secretary General determines that MONUC can carry out its functions in conditions of adequate security and with the cooperation of the parties. These functions, to be exercised in cooperation with the JMC, include preparation of an action plan within 45 days covering such matters as maintenance of the cease-fire, disarmament of all armed groups, and the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces. MONUC is to monitor implementation of the cease-fire, investigate violations, and supervise and verify the disengagement of forces. At the same time, it is to facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, support the national dialogue, and launch a survey of landmines and unexploded ordinance. On February 16, 2000 then-U.N. Ambassador Holbrooke warmly endorsed the expansion of MONUC in testimony before the Africa Subcommittee of the House Committee on International Relations. According to Holbrooke, "without strong U.N. leadership...there is a high probability - in fact a near certainty - of a catastrophic political and humanitarian disaster in central Africa," including a risk of genocide and regional war. Holbrooke affirmed that no U.S. forces would participate in MONUC on the ground and noted that there might be an additional or Phase III enlargement of MONUC to further reinforce the peace process. (Estimates of the scale of any Phase III deployment have typically ranged between 10,000 and 25,000. A U.N. force deployed in Congo from 1960-1964 reached nearly 20,000 troops and incurred 250 fatalities, including accidental and natural deaths as well as 126 deaths in combat.) Representative Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the full committee, warned Holbrooke against peacekeeping operations that "are poorly defined, could end badly, and leave in their wake little support for future endeavors." On February 7, 2000, the Clinton Administration notified Congress of its intention to support the MONUC expansion, which it estimated would cost $160 million over six months, with the United States responsible for $40 million of this amount. In its FY2001 budget submission to Congress, the Department of State estimated that the U.S. share of pre-expansion MONUC expenses would be $4 million in FY2000, and it requested $94.5 million for MONUC in FY2001. The Secretary General's reports to the Security Council on MONUC deployment consistently complained of obstacles created by the Kabila government and rebel forces that have denied full freedom of movement to MONUC personnel. The Congo government has insisted on clearing all U.N. flights on a case-by-case basis, which in itself, the Secretary General has noted, would make it impossible to manage the large fleet of aircraft that would be required for Phase II deployment. As a result of the many problems encountered, only 224 liaison officers and military observers had been sent to Congo by December 1, 2000, although the U.N. had succeeded in deploying liaison officers at the headquarters of each rebel group and at several other key locations, such as Mbandaka. In his December 6, 2000 report, the Secretary General stated that the Congo government had been showing a "more positive attitude" and was relaxing some restrictions on MONUC. He concluded by recommending the deployment of additional military observers, with supporting personnel and equipment, but added that any infantry deployments would have to await agreement on several "key questions," such as the withdrawal of foreign forces and the demobilization of other armed groups. On December 14, 2000, the United Nations Security Council voted to extend the mandate of the MONUC peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) until June 15, 2001. Resolution 1332 endorsed the Secretary General's proposal to send additional military observers to Congo when he considers that conditions permit. In addition, the resolution called for all parties, particularly the DRC government, to continue to cooperate in the deployment of MONUC; and for Ugandan and Rwandan forces, and all foreign forces, to withdraw from Congo in accordance with the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement. Background to the Congo Conflict The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC or DROC), formerly Zaire, is a vast, resource-rich country at the heart of Central Africa. It borders nine other countries, and events there can have an impact over much of the sub-Saharan region. Secure transport on the Congo River, as well as potential road and rail routes across Congo, could be a great economic boon to the region, and Congo could be an important market for neighboring states. As recently as the 1980s, Zaire was the world's largest producer of cobalt and a leading producer of industrial diamonds as well as copper. It has petroleum deposits, much good farmland, and great hydroelectric potential. Yet Congo's economy today is in ruins, following a prolonged breakdown in governance and periodic outbreaks of political unrest. Zaire, long troubled by economic decline and political stagnation, seemed to be entering a new era on May 17, 1997, when troops of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), swept into Kinshasa, the capital. AFDL leader Laurent Kabila immediately renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo, declared himself president, and was formally sworn into office, with sweeping powers, on May 29, 1997. The ousted president, Mobutu Sese Seko, who had ruled since 1965 -- and had given Congo the unpopular name of "Zaire" -- died in exile on September 7, 1997. In a May 17, 1998 speech commemorating the anniversary of the revolution, Kabila claimed credit for ending the looting and intimidation practiced by Mobutu's soldiers, stabilizing the country's currency, and dealing with underlying social problems, such as tribalism. Observers generally agreed that the security situation had indeed improved, except in eastern Congo. Inflation had been reduced, and in June 1998, the government launched a new currency, the Congolese franc. Kabila seemed to enjoy broad public support in recognition of his success in ousting Mobutu, even if he was not deeply popular everywhere. Some sensed that Congo's sense of national unity seemed stronger as well. Yet Congo was still a deeply troubled nation, and the situation has since deteriorated further. Government authority is weak even in regions ostensibly under Kabila's control, and civil servants are paid irregularly, just as in the Mobutu era. The Kabila regime is probably obtaining some financial backing from contracts with foreign mining firms, but has failed to attract the large-scale foreign investment needed to spark an economic recovery. Political uncertainties, erratic behavior toward particular foreign firms, rapid inflation, and the absence of a legal regime governing business affairs are particular problems. In September 1999, Kabila closed all foreign exchange offices and imposed a $500,000 fee, termed a financial guarantee, on all foreigners engaged in commercial activities. Fuel prices nearly tripled in June 2000, following a 60% devaluation in the Congolese franc. Congo's relations with the donor community and non-governmental organizations are seriously strained over issues related to democratization, human rights, and economic reform. Rebellion in the East. The unsettled eastern Congo, particularly North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, is torn by violence and highly unstable. Ex-soldiers from Mobutu's army ("ex-FAZ") operate in the area; and militant Hutu bands exiled from Rwanda and known as Interahamwe (see below), as well as Hutu soldiers belonging to the former armed forces of Rwanda ("ex-FAR") and Hutu exiles from Burundi, contribute to the unrest. The governments of Rwanda and Burundi are dominated by individuals of the Tutsi ethnic group, and they want to prevent incursions by Hutu militants from Congo into their countries. (The Hutu are a majority in both countries.) Leaders of Rwanda and Burundi also sympathize with persecuted Tutsi living in Congo. "Mai Mai" guerrillas in Congo, known for their supposed belief that water and amulets can shield them from bullets, are strongly anti-Tutsi and are a major factor in the unrest in the east, as are the Bembe people of South Kivu, who have long resented Tutsi settlers. During the 1996-1997 revolution in Congo, Rwanda had given military support to Kabila against Mobutu, believing the rebel leader would be willing and able to control the Hutu militants in eastern Congo. Once in power, however, Kabila found he had to cope with the unpopularity of Tutsi soldiers in Kinshasa, where they were widely viewed as arrogant foreigners, and with popular resentment of the Tutsi who held influential positions in his government and party. Kabila himself seemed to grow increasingly suspicious of his Tutsi lieutenants. A July 27, 1998 Congolese government announcement that the presence of Rwandan soldiers in Congo had been "terminated" seemed to trigger the outbreak of the new rebellion. Whether the rebellion had been planned long in advance or came about spontaneously remains a subject of speculation, but on August 2, the Tenth Battalion of the Congolese army, based at Goma in North Kivu, broadcast a communique accusing Kabila of corruption and nepotism and stating that the army had decided to remove him from power. The major towns in eastern Congo quickly fell into rebel hands, and in a surprise strategic move, rebels flew troops to western Congo and seized the military base and airfield at Kitona. Rebels soon gained control of Congo's seaports and a hydroelectric dam supplying Kinshasa, a city of 5 million people. Periodic blackouts ensued as rebels predicted the fall of Kinshasa by the end of August. In mid-August 1998, the armies of Zimbabwe and Angola came to Kabila's aid, breaking the siege of Kinshasa and eventually stabilizing the military situation. Today, rebel forces and their foreign supporters hold roughly the eastern third of the country along a fluctuating line running from somewhere south of Zongo in the northwest to the north end of Lake Mweru in the southeast. Foreign Involvement. The second Congo rebellion, like the first, has clearly been backed by Uganda and Rwanda from the outset. On November 7, 1998, Rwanda acknowledged that it had troops in Congo to protect itself from Congo-based Hutu militants. Uganda, which like Rwanda has had to deal with incursions by Congo-based rebels, also acknowledged sending troops into Congo for national security reasons. Some observers suspect Uganda and Rwanda of territorial ambitions in Congo and of seeking to exploit the eastern region's resources -- charges both countries deny. However, repeated clashes in 1999 and 2000 between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Kisangani, at the center of a resource-rich region, lent credence to the view that the two erstwhile allies were actually rivals for Congo's riches. The clashes, which killed hundreds of civilians and brought heavy international condemnation, came to an end in June 2000, then the two countries agreed to withdraw their forces from Kisangani. In South Kivu, meanwhile, troops from the Tutsi-dominated Burundi army have reportedly conducted operations against Burundi Hutu rebels. Under Kabila, Congo had joined the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and this move proved crucial in winning support against the rebellion. The head of SADC's security organ, Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe, became an advocate of SADC armed intervention on Kabila's behalf. Analysts speculate that Mugabe saw a chance in the Congo crisis to restore his reputation as a key African leader and to reduce what he may see as the undue regional influence enjoyed by South Africa. Angola also favored backing the Kabila government, betting that Kabila would help prevent Congo from being used as a rear base by the armed Angolan opposition force known as UNITA. The thousands of exiled Hutu militants from Rwanda, including Interahamwe and ex-FAR, also joined the fight on Kabila's behalf. News reports estimate the number of Zimbabwe troops in Congo at 11,000 or more. There have been protests in Harare, the Zimbabwe capital, against this deployment, and Zimbabwe's troops are believed to have suffered a number of casualties. IMF and World Bank lending to Zimbabwe is suspended in part because of concerns the two multilateral lenders have over Zimbabwe spending in Congo. (See CRS Issue Brief IB10059, Zimbabwe: Current Issues.) Zimbabwe business interests, taking advantage of the Zimbabwe-Kabila alliance, have been active in Congo; and in June 2000, there were reports that a Zimbabwe-linked company, Oryx Natural Resources, had been formed to mine diamonds around Mbuji Mayi. Oryx is reportedly partly owned by another company with ties to the Zimbabwe government and military, and is headed by an Omani businessman. There have been some reports that North Korean troops are providing training to Kabila forces and of a North Korean presence at an abandoned uranium mine in Congo. (The Times, London, October 12, 1999; Sunday Telegraph, London, January 16, 2000.) Firm evidence to substantiate these reports appears to be lacking, however; nor is there clear confirmation of reports of large shipments of weapons from China to Kabila's army. The RCD and MLC. The principal rebel movement in eastern Congo calls itself the Congolese Democratic Assembly (or Rally, RCD), which is now broken into two factions. Despite its apparent foreign backing, it has a civilian, Congolese leadership core that includes individuals from around the country. Until he was ousted on May 17, 1999, the RCD president or "co-ordinator" was Wamba dia Wamba, who is from the lower Congo region in western Congo. Wamba had been a professor in Tanzania, and was reportedly a friend of the late former Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere. Jailed for a time during the Mobutu era for conducting research in Zaire, he was active in the Sovereign National Conference (see below) in the early 1990s. Wamba has kept control of the smaller RCD faction, but this group has been weakened by internal rivalries and ethnic strife around its base at Bunia. Emile Ilunga, who initially replaced Wamba as head of the main body of the RCD, is a Katangan formerly associated with a Katanga separatist movement based in Angola. A physician, Ilunga has reportedly practiced in Belgium and spent time in South Africa. RCD leaders say the movement seeks a multiparty, federal system. In October 2000, Ilunga acknowledged mistakes of leadership and resigned in favor of Adolphe Onusumba Yemba, known as Onusumba, who is reportedly from the Kasai region and considerably younger than Ilunga. Another rebel group, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), emerged in northwestern Congo in November 1998. This faction is led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, whose family was closely allied to Mobutu, and is believed to include former members of Mobutu's Presidential Guard. The MLC holds Gbadolite, a former Mobutu stronghold, and has repeatedly threatened the Congo River port of Mbandaka. The capture of Mbandaka, analysts believe, would endanger Kinshasa, the capital, since no natural obstacles or major towns lie between the two cities. During Congo/Zaire's 1996-1997 civil war, Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) managed to conquer a country nearly as large as the European Union in just seven months. The takeover was made possible by the refusal of the rarely-paid Zairian army to fight, the lack of support for Mobutu among the Zairian people, and backing for the rebels from neighboring states. President Mobutu was gravely ill with prostate cancer and unable to make critical military and political decisions. Armed conflict first broke out in South Kivu province in mid-October 1996 between the army and indigenous ethnic Tutsi -- a group found primarily in neighboring Rwanda and Burundi, where Tutsi minorities dominate government and the armed forces. Known as the Banyamulenge, the South Kivu Tutsi are descendants of herders who came to the area as long as 200 years ago and may number 300,000 to 400,000 or more today. They had been targets of increasing local resentment arising from ethnic differences and economic grievances, and the Mobutu regime was intensifying an effort to deprive them of their citizenship. In October 1996, Tutsi in South Kivu were ordered to leave by the region's deputy governor, but Tutsi guerrillas, some of whom may have had experience in the Rwanda civil war, fought back with surprising effectiveness. In North Kivu, other Tutsi guerrillas, acting in alliance with local, non-Tutsi militia, completed the capture of Goma. Tutsi had first arrived in North Kivu during the colonial period. Tutsi rebels were motivated in part by anger over a local anti-Tutsi campaign, beginning in 1993, that had displaced large numbers of their people and reportedly killed thousands. Ethnic tensions in eastern Zaire had been gravely exacerbated by the July 1994 arrival in eastern Zaire of an estimated 1.2 million Hutu refugees from Rwanda. The Hutu, traditional rivals of the Tutsi, had fled Rwanda as the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) was consolidating its conquest of Rwanda. The RPF had been provoked into a military offensive in April 1994, when Hutu militants, including armed bands known as Interahamwe ("those who attack together"), launched an anti-Tutsi genocide. When the Zaire rebellion broke out, Goma was surrounded by Hutu refugee camps housing 700,000 people or more, and there were Hutu refugees in other locations as well. Interahamwe and ex-FAR at the camps, as well former Rwanda government officials, were widely suspected of intimidating civilian refugees to prevent them from returning to Rwanda. These Hutu militants were also thought to have organized armed incursions back into Rwanda and to be preparing for an attempt to retake the country. Rwandan authorities demanded that the international community take steps to curb their activities, but nothing was done. The initial Tutsi victories exposed the weakness of the Mobutu regime, and the rebellion broadened with the early and unexpected emergence of the AFDL, uniting the Tutsi groups with other Zaire opposition forces. The AFDL coalition leader, Laurent Kabila (born in 1939) was initially described as a Lunda, the predominant ethnic group in Shaba province, but was later said to be a "Balubakat." These are Luba people, originally from the Kasais, who settled in Shaba province -- then named Katanga -- in search of economic opportunities during the colonial era. Kabila was a veteran of previous revolutionary struggles, and worked with Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara when Che was supporting a revolution in eastern Zaire in the mid-1960s. Kabila's Party of the Popular Revolution (PRP) survived for years in the mountains around Uvira, and originally had a Marxist orientation. In 1975, Kabila guerrillas crossed Lake Tanganyika and kidnaped three American and one Dutch student working at the chimpanzee study center run by British naturalist Jane Goodall. Held under harsh conditions before they were ransomed, the four victims remained bitter toward Kabila. They wrote Secretary of State Albright on May 23, 1997, asking the Clinton Administration to confront the rebel leader about his record of "kidnaping, slavery, and terrorism." (Washington Post, October 25, 1997.) There was considerable foreign involvement in the Zaire revolution. In a July 9, 1997, Washington Post interview, Paul Kagame, now Rwanda's President, claimed that his government had planned and carried out the overthrow of Mobutu, sending soldiers and officers to participate in the fighting. Many observers also believe that Uganda played a role, and Angola also evidently gave direct support to the rebels. Its government resented Mobutu for the covert aid, shelter, and political support he gave over many years to the UNITA opposition movement. UNITA meanwhile, was widely reported to have aided Mobutu. After his 1997 takeover, Kabila promised elections by April 1999, but he now says that elections cannot be held until the rebellion has ended. A draft constitution provides for a strong presidency, although there would also be a bicameral parliament. Opposition figures suspect that Kabila will try to arrange any elections process to assure that he remains in power. The activities of political parties other than the AFDL were suspended after Kabila took over, and anti-government demonstrations were banned. Kabila's treatment of the press and opposition voices in society raised grave concerns among human rights and democracy advocates. Several journalists were arrested or harassed, some newspapers were closed, and the opposition was denied access to the broadcast media, which the government controls. Some opposition politicians, other government critics, and figures from the former regime were also arrested. Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, who led the non-violent political struggle against Mobutu, at great personal cost over many years, was exiled to his remote home village by Kabila in February 1998, although he was later allowed to return to Kinshasa. Tshisekedi, who regards himself as Congo's rightful prime minister, is an advocate of what he calls "plural democracy" and a strong critic of the political party ban. Kabila criticizes Tshisekedi and the rest of the non-violent opposition to Mobutu for their fractiousness and ineffectiveness against Mobutu. Tshisekedi is reportedly regarded as a "difficult person" and "tempestuous" by some western observers (Washington Post, June 27, 1997). Both phases of the Congo conflict have been marked by serious human rights abuses, hunger, killings of civilians, and the forcible displacement of civilian populations; but detailed and reliable information on the humanitarian situation has been difficult to obtain. On June 29, 1998, U.N. Secretary General Annan transmitted to the Security Council the report of a U.N. team that had been investigating allegations of massacres and other human rights violations during the 1996-1997 civil war. The Secretary General said two conclusions stood out: that all parties to the conflict had committed serious human rights violations; and that killings by the AFDL and elements of the Rwandan Patriotic Army constituted crimes against humanity and may have constituted genocide, pending further investigation. The Secretary General noted with "deep regret" that the investigating team had not been allowed to carry out its mission fully and without hindrance by the Congolese government. The governments of Congo and Rwanda rejected the findings of the report. Non-governmental organizations have released a number of reports alleging widespread human rights abuses during the current phase of the Congo conflict. For example, a Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org study issued on May 16, 2000, charged that Congo rebels and Rwandan soldiers have carried out rapes and civilian killings on a massive scale. Amnesty International charged on June 1, 2000 that Ugandan troops had played a role in ethnic unrest in the Ituri region, near the Ugandan border, that killed 7,000 civilians in 1999. Uganda firmly denied the charge, and a spokesman claimed that Ugandan troops were noted for their good discipline. (Africa News Service, June 1, 2000.) The Department of State issued a statement on October 18, 2000, saying that "the United States is deeply concerned by reports of violence against human rights workers in the rebel-controlled and Rwandan-occupied area" of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The statement cited an October 9 report by Human Rights Watch. A study released by the International Rescue Committee on June 9, 2000 concluded that since 1998, 1.7 million people in eastern Congo who would not otherwise have perished have died. The study, supervised by an epidemiologist at the Johns Hopkins University, noted that the deaths resulted primarily from the chaotic situation in the east, which has forced many civilians to flee into the forests and brought the collapse of systems for preventing outbreaks of malaria and other diseases. (New York Times, June 9, 2000.) Congo's difficulties result in part from the stunning rate of change it has confronted over a short span of history. In 1930, Congo was a rural, peasant-based society under the control of a tiny elite of Belgian bureaucrats assisted by a few senior Congolese clerks. Today, the country has a sprawling capital of five to eight million inhabitants, an overall population nearing 45 million (up from 20 million in 1970), and a complex social structure that includes a kaleidoscope of conflicting ethnic loyalties as well as sharp economic and social class divisions. (Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, 1985, p. 79.) Congo has posed challenges for the broader international system for more than a century. The Conference of Berlin (1884-1885) accepted the claims of King Léopold II to this sprawling territory of diverse peoples and many languages in order to stave off a destabilizing scramble for the region among Europe's great powers. The brutal repression, mutilations, and forced labor characteristic of Léopold's rule were exposed by human rights activists and missionaries at the turn of the century, and the situation in the Congo became an international scandal. (Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost, Houghton-Mifflin, 1998). In 1908, the Belgian parliament voted to remove the colony from Léopold's personal control and make it a Belgian colony. Belgium adopted a highly paternalistic style of rule, treating Congolese as incapable of self-government. Reportedly, when independence came in 1960, not one Congo citizen had received a university degree. Political parties only began to emerge in the 1950's, and according to a leading authority, "Large-scale contact with the outside world dates only from the Brussels Exposition (World Fair) of 1958, where several hundred Congolese were brought to Belgium as showpieces for the Congolese pavilion." (Young, Politics in the Congo, 1965, pp. 280-281). Congo's initial upheaval broke out in July 1960, just after independence. The Belgian government had agreed to set a date for independence only in January, finally acknowledging that a small European country could not hope to maintain a large colony in Africa in the face of rising nationalism around the continent. Nonetheless, Belgian officers attempted to retain control of the Congolese army after independence, leading to a mutiny and attacks on Europeans. A United Nations peacekeeping force intervened in the resulting unrest in an effort to prevent the situation from becoming a Cold War crisis. In fact, however, Congo did become a major Cold War issue after Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who enjoyed the sympathy and backing of the Soviet Union, was killed in 1961. The Soviets halted their contributions to U.N. peacekeeping, leading to a financial crisis that crippled the United Nations for years. Dag Hammarskjold, who had shown himself to be a strong and effective. U.N. Secretary General, was killed in a suspicious plane crash as he flew to negotiations on an end to the secession of rebellious Katanga province. The U.N. force withdrew in 1964, leaving the country united, but politically unsettled, and facing continued secessionist threats in key regions. In November 1965, General Joseph Mobutu, a former journalist who had risen to command the armed forces, seized power in a bloodless coup. The coup won ready acceptance in western capitals, where Mobutu already had many advocates, because of concern that the civilian regime was moving to the left. Over the next few years, Mobutu managed to neutralize his political opposition, thwart secessionist tendencies in key regions, and consolidate his power base. His methods, which included the arrest and humiliation of former allies and the elimination of independent labor unions, were authoritarian but perhaps not unusual among Third World countries at that time. In the 1970s, however, Mobutu began a series of disruptive political and economic initiatives that brought a prolonged decline in the nation's fortunes -- leading to eventual economic collapse and finally to the political crisis of 1991. His "authenticity" campaign, launched in 1971, in addition to requiring Zairians to abandon western styles of dress, included banning Christian forenames and prohibiting religious broadcasts. Mobutu himself adopted a series of honorific titles, such as Guide, Helmsman, and Father of the Nation. At the end of 1973, he launched his "Zairianization" campaign for the economy, which resulted in the seizure of foreign-owned properties and their redistribution to Mobutu loyalists. Many of the extreme measures undertaken by Mobutu in the first half of the 1970s had to be eased or retracted in subsequent years. But the confidence of foreign investors and lenders had been badly shaken, and the economy never recovered. A long era of negative growth set in, worsened by low world prices for copper, the high cost of oil imports, and what analysts described as pervasive corruption. Nonetheless, some observers credited Mobutu's policies with maintaining stability and minimizing ethnic conflict. Critics argued, however, that in stifling political dissent and impoverishing Zaire's people, Mobutu was only bottling up resentments that were bound to explode at some point. Mobutu's political position deteriorated sharply in 1990, as domestic and international pressures forced him into major policy changes and concessions. The denouement of the Cold War reduced the incentives for western governments to offer him political or economic support. Meanwhile, Tshisekedi's Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) joined with student groups to mount a series of protests and demonstrations. Police and military repression of these protests brought fresh international criticism. In 1990, Mobutu finally accepted the creation of a full multi-party system in principle. The continued deterioration of the economy, however, was adding fuel to popular anger, and large demonstrations broke out. In April 1991, Mobutu acceded to a key opposition demand by announcing that a national political conference would be convened. The Sovereign National Conference finally began its work in April 1992, and a long contest for power with Mobutu ensued. But while Kinshasa politicians were pre-occupied with this power struggle, the power of the central government was declining, contributing to concerns over the possible breakup of Zaire. East Kasai and its capital, Mbuji-Mayi, experienced relative prosperity based on a black market diamond industry. Investments by South African companies helped to re-orient the economy of mineral-rich Shaba province toward English- speaking southern Africa rather than Kinshasa. Despite growing regionalism, some observers were encouraged during the mid-1990s by the emergence of a civil society in Zaire, centered around churches and non-governmental organizations. Student groups, human rights organizations, and political parties were increasingly effective and typically led by articulate, outspoken individuals. With a loosening of economic controls, the private enterprise sector grew stronger, although major business figures tended to be closely connected to Mobutu. Diplomats in Africa and the West had hoped that the months following the signing of the Lusaka agreement would see the arrival of growing numbers of peacekeepers, and - as confidence in the process built - a gradual withdrawal of foreign forces and the launching of a substantive dialogue between rebel leaders and the Kabila regime. Kabila came to be seen as an obstacle to the peace process, and some now hope that his removal will lead to progress in meeting these objectives. Others are concerned that a power vacuum has been created in Kinshasa and anticipate that it could deepen as figures in Kabila's regime contend to succeed him. Some reports indicate that Joseph Kabila lacks his father's charisma and question his ability to maintain control. Joseph reportedly spent many years outside Congo, including a period of military training in China, and is said not to be conversant in Lingala, the principal language in Kinshasa and much of Congo. Reports that his mother was Tutsi may also tend to deprive him of a popular following in the capital. Rivals may include Edy Kapend, Kabila's personal chief of staff; interior minister Gaetan Kakudji; and defense minister Godefroid Tchamlesso. Analysts report that none of these has as yet developed a reputation for effective leadership. Conceivably, one or more rebel groups could try to take advantage of the situation and move on Kinshasa. Jean Pierre Bemba's MLC, which has been poised near Mbandaka for months, seems particularly well placed to launch an offensive. Other rebel groups and the foreign armies in Congo might make moves and countermoves as well, leading to increased fighting, mounting civilian deaths, and new refugee flows. If no leader proves capable of uniting Congo, the country could experience a prolonged, de-facto breakup leaving an unstable central government backed by Angola and Zimbabwe in control of the capital region and the coast; Bemba and ex-Mobutuists dominant in the northwest, with support from Uganda; Uganda in control of the northeast in alliance with the small dia Wamba RCD faction; and South Kivu together with an undefined area to the west under the RCD with backing from Rwanda. The fate of mineral-rich Katanga (Shaba) and the Kasais, including the diamond center at Mbuji Mayi, in this break-up scenario is not yet clear. If the peace process resumes at some point, deployment of the Phase II peacekeeping force will face major difficulties in view of the large number of armed groups, the large stores of weapons that have accumulated over years of conflict, and the country's gravely deteriorated infrastructure. Nonetheless, such a force, working in cooperation with an actively engaged JMC and backed by pressure from donors, could eventually prepare the way for a Phase III deployment and other steps toward long-term stabilization. Congo was a contentious issue in U.S. foreign policy from 1960 into the early 1990s. The Cold War and the emergence of a communist regime in Cuba were very much on the minds of policymakers in 1960, and lent a special urgency to their efforts to stabilize Congo through U.N. peacekeeping. Policy-makers saw this approach as the best available means for minimizing Soviet influence in Congo. Some U.S. critics of this policy, however, regarded the United Nations itself as a leftist influence and thought that the United States should have fostered the secession of Katanga province as a bastion against communism. The most controversial event of that era was the death of Prime Minister Lumumba in January 1961. Many American observers regarded him as a communist and Soviet agent; although others argued that he was essentially a nationalist and populist. Evidence developed at 1975 Senate hearings indicated that U.S. officials had attempted to implement a plan to assassinate Lumumba through poisoning or exposure to a virus. This plot evidently failed, and Lumumba died in Katanga after falling into the hands of secessionist forces. Whether the United States played a role in this event was a matter of controversy, but it is widely believed in Congo that the United States was indeed responsible. Many Congolese also blame the United Nations, which had a peacekeeping force in Congo at the time, for failing to protect Lumumba. Mobutu enjoyed good relations with the United States in the first years of his regime. President Carter, however, pressed for human rights improvements as well as political and economic reforms. Nonetheless, Carter found himself lending air transport to an intervention by Belgium, France, and other countries during the 1978 Shaba uprising because of concern over Soviet gains in Africa. Mobutu's relations with the Reagan Administration were close, and in 1983 Reagan described the Zairian leader as "a faithful friend to the United States for some 20 years." In the late 1980s, officials often expressed reservations about Mobutu's human rights record and economic policies but suggested that no alternative leader appeared capable of maintaining stability in Zaire. In the early 1960s, U.S. economic aid to Zaire amounted to between one-quarter and one-third of all U.S. economic assistance to sub-Saharan Africa. Aid reached high levels again in FY1976 through FY1978 in response to perceived Soviet gains in Africa and the crises in Shaba province. Aid rose once more in the second half of the 1980s, reflecting Zaire's deteriorating economic situation and perhaps Zaire's cooperative role in the Angola situation. Since the beginning of 1986, the executive branch had publicly acknowledged giving covert assistance to UNITA in Angola, and according to many press reports, important facilities for channeling this aid to UNITA were located in Zaire. The focus of U.S. Angola policy after 1991 shifted to implementation of the Angolan peace agreements, and Zaire lost any value it might have had as a staging area for covert U.S. military aid. The deteriorating situation in Zaire after the beginning of 1990, the end of the Cold War, and the Angolan agreements decisively shifted executive branch views of Mobutu. Secretary of State James Baker visited Zaire in March 1990 and urged Mobutu to undertake reforms -- or risk being swept aside. The Clinton Administration continued to pressure Mobutu for reforms, and efforts were launched to persuade Zairians across the political spectrum, including Mobutu, to move forward with a free and fair vote. U.S. policy on Zaire was impeded by the weakening of policy coordination in the "troika" of major external actors -- France, Belgium, and the United States -- after the May 1995 election of President Jacques Chirac in France. Chirac met personally with Mobutu in April 1996, and Paris said it would resume aid to Zaire. French policymakers appeared to see the United States as a competitor for economic and political influence in Zaire. In May 1997, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson carried out an urgent round of diplomacy in Zaire and the region aimed at arranging what he later called a "soft-landing" for Kabila's rebels when they reached the capital to avoid "bloodshed and chaos." Secretary Albright announced during a December 12, 1997 press conference with Kabila that she would be working with Congress on a $35- $40 million aid package to assist the Congolese people and their government in building democratic institutions and governing capacity. With the deteriorating political situation in Congo, discussion of a substantial aid program faded. According to USAID's FY2000 Congressional Presentation, a "full development program is neither advisable nor possible." For FY2001, the Clinton Administration requested $12.9 million in economic assistance as well as a small amount for an International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. The IMET program was not launched, however, due to the continuing conflict. (Aid for Congo and for other African countries is not earmarked, and actual assistance figures for projected aid in FY2001 are not yet available.) The Clinton Administration strongly supported the Lusaka peace process. Ambassador Holbrooke has repeatedly affirmed that there can be no armed solution to the Congo conflict and that the Lusaka process offers the only way forward. Congressional concerns over the Mobutu regime began to grow in the late 1970s. In subsequent years, a series of hearings and reports, sometimes growing out of Member and staff visits, focused on allegations of corruption, human rights violations, and shortcomings in the U.S. aid program. In 1985, Congress imposed restrictions on security assistance to Zaire, and in the early 1990s, as instability and human rights violations mounted in Zaire, both the House and Senate passed resolutions urging Mobutu to step down (102nd Congress, H.Con.Res. 238, S.Con.Res. 80). After the Rwanda upheaval, several Members studied the refugee situation directly through visits to the camps around Goma. The obstacles created by the Kabila regime to the U.N. investigation of human rights violations during the first rebellion, as well as reports of ongoing human rights violations, gave rise to some skepticism toward the new regime -- and toward Clinton Administration policy. The Foreign Operations Appropriations legislation for FY2001 (P.L. 106-429) prohibits assistance to the central government to the Congo. Return to CONTENTS section of this
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