Norwegian Commercial Whaling: Issues for Congress

Carl Ek
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

December 31, 1996

97-55 F

CONTENTS:

BACKGROUND
POLICY ISSUES
--ECOLOGICAL ISSUES
--ETHICAL ISSUES
--POLITICAL ISSUES
ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
-- INVOKE PELLY AMENDMENT SANCTIONS
-- ACCEPT A SCIENCE-BASED SOLUTION
-- CONTINUE THE "GOOD FAITH DIALOGUE"
ENDNOTES

SUMMARY

On May 16, 1996, 23 Members of Congress sent a letter to President Clinton expressing their concern over Norway's announcement that it intended to permit its whalers to kill as many as 425 minke whales that year. The co-signers urged the President "to take decisive action to prevent Norway from resuming its illicit whale harvesting," including the possible use of economic sanctions. For its 1997 hunt, Norway has increased its quota to 580 animals.

The Norwegian government strongly argues that their whaling activities are neither irresponsible from an ecological standpoint nor illicit from a legal one. According to a 1996 abundance estimate, as yet unreviewed by the International Whaling Commission's (IWC) Scientific Committee, there are about 118,000 minke whales in the northeast and central Atlantic Ocean that are accessible to Norwegian whalers; if the abundance estimate is accurate, Norway's self-imposed 1996 hunt quota of 425 is unlikely to significantly reduce the minke whale population. Because the Norwegian government lodged an official objection when the IWCestablished a moratorium on commercial whaling in 1986 by adopting zero quotas for such whaling, Norway is not bound by the moratorium. Norway complied with the moratorium until 1993, when it resumed commercial whaling.

For more than two decades, the United States government has supported a moratorium on commercial whaling. After working to ensure that any resumption of commercial whaling would be sustainable, the U.S. government began in the early 1990s to oppose more forcefully all commercial whaling. Most opponents of commercial whaling object on ethical or ecological grounds; however, important political considerations also arise in the debate. The current dispute with Norway over whaling is affected by a number of such factors, not least among them being that Norway has long been one of America's closest allies. U.S. policymakers may consider a number of options vis-a-vis Norway, ranging from pressuring Norway with trade sanctions, as urged by several environmental groups, to supporting a quota for northeastern Atlantic minke whales, calculated using the catch-limit formula developed by the IWC's Scientific Committee, as urged by the Norwegians.

Some analysts view the Norwegian whaling issue as one chapter of a continuing international debate over the interconnections between trade and environment, in which the United States has considered the use of economic sanctions as one method of reaching beyond its traditional jurisdiction, compelling other nations to adopt similar environmental goals.

BACKGROUND

It is estimated that more than 2.5 million large whales have been killed by commercial whalers during the past 4 centuries. (See Endnote 1.) Today, most stocks of large whales are far less abundant than when commercial whaling began. (See Endnote 2.) Although Norwegians have been hunting whales for more than a thousand years, historians maintain that commercial whaling is a relatively modern enterprise, beginning for the Norwegians in the 19th Century, and that Norwegian small-type (small vessel) coastal whaling was established only early in this century. In the early decades of this century, when the industry faced increasing competition caused by the substitution of petroleum products for whale oil, some of the world's major whaling nations began to fear that low prices could harm their pelagic (i.e., high seas, as opposed to coastal) whaling industries. Consequently, these nations negotiated an agreement to limit the number of whales killed. Other nations, concerned over the decline of certain whale stocks, attempted to establish international control under the auspices of the League of Nations.

In 1946, several nations, including Norway, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, negotiated the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). The ICRW, administered by the International Whaling Commission (IWC), states that "increases in the size of whale stocks will permit increases in the numbers of whales which may be captured without endangering these natural resources." Toward that end, the ICRW provides for "the proper conservation of whales stocks" to "make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry." The ICRW notes that member states shared a broad interest "in safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources represented by whale stocks," and that the IWC would take action to provide for the "optimum utilization of the whale resources."

In the 1950s and 1960s, Norway and other nations were eager for the IWC to establish quotas because whale stocks were continuing to dwindle. Norway withdrew its pelagic whaling fleet from Antarctic waters in 1968 and confined itself to small-type coastal whaling. They supported making the IWC regime effective for achieving realistic whale catch levels and argued for improved scientific methods and urged the IWC to give greater weight to the recommendations of its Scientific Committee when agreeing to whale catch levels.

By the 1970s, support for a total prohibition of commercial whaling began to build. In Stockholm in 1972, delegates to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment called for a moratorium on commercial whaling, and the United States (which ceased commercial whaling in 1971) supported this resolution. Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, the character of the IWC began to change as additional non-whaling nations became party to the ICRW and sought to increase the protection afforded whales. In 1982, a three-quarters majority (See Endnote 3.) of IWC members accepted a proposal for a moratorium on (a zero-quota period for) (See Endnote 4.) commercial whaling, fully effective in 1986; the motion also called for a comprehensive assessment of the moratorium's effects on whale stocks to be undertaken by 1990. (See Endnote 5.) In addition to permitting whale stocks to recover, the moratorium was intended to provide an opportunity to deal with issues of scientific uncertainty and lack of data through the development of a Revised Management Procedure (RMP) that would assure that any quotas set would be sustainable, as well as to develop adequate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.

The moratorium decision was not accepted unanimously, however. The ICRW permits member nations voting in the minority to "object" to an IWC Schedule decision, and thereby not be bound by a ruling. Norway lodged an objection to the moratorium decision. (See Endnote 6.) Thus, Norway's current whaling activities are in compliance with the ICRW. (See Endnote 7.)

The Norwegians contend that the complete ban on commercial whaling is contrary to the ICRW's mandate. They argue, moreover, that the comprehensive assessment of the moratorium's effect on whale stocks has not been undertaken as Norway had contemplated during the debate on the moratorium. However, the IWC's Scientific Committee noted that, from a biological standpoint, four years was too short a period in which to determine whether the moratorium had helped over-exploited stocks begin to recover. The Norwegians emphasize that the IWC was established as a whaling management organization, not as a whale protection or preservation body (which could preclude killing whales), and was aimed at promoting sustainable whaling. Norwegians assert that, in accordance with contemporary international law, IWC members should adhere to the ICRW.

Some governments as well as many environmental and animal protection advocates disagree with the Norwegian viewpoint, holding the whale preservation efforts of the IWC to be a legitimate expression of evolving IWC authority as voted by the ICRW parties. They contend that whales are not the property of any single nation and that unilateral action, such as that taken by Norway, is unjustified and potentially harmful. The 1992 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro identified cetaceans (whales and dolphins) as a special group of animals, distinct from fish.

In June 1986, the U.S. Department of Commerce certified that Norway was diminishing the effectiveness of the IWC's conservation regime. This opened the door for the President to impose trade sanctions against Norway under the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act (22 U.S.C. 1978). Norway announced in July 1986 that it would suspend commercial whaling after the 1987 season and reduce the 1987 catch to less than the 1986 take of 400 minke whales. (See Endnote 8.) Based on this announcement, President Reagan decided not to impose trade sanctions.

Norway suspended commercial whaling in 1987. However, after the IWC's Scientific Committee in 1992 accepted 86,700 animals as the best estimate of the northeast Atlantic minke whale population, Norway resumed commercial whaling in 1993. (See Endnote 9.) When it did so, Norway encountered sharp criticism from several other countries, particularly the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United States.

On August 5, 1993, the U.S. Department of Commerce again certified, pursuant to the Pelly Amendment, that Norway's unilateral resumption of whaling undermined the effectiveness of the IWC's international conservation regime. In a letter to Congress, President Clinton stated that, while "[t]he United States is deeply opposed to commercial whaling," it "has an equally strong commitment to science-based solutions to global conservation problems," and that "not every country agrees with our position against commercial whaling." The letter concluded that, while U.S. trade restrictions would be justified, "our objectives can best be achieved by delaying the implementation of sanctions until we have exhausted all good faith efforts to persuade Norway to follow agreed conservation measures." Notwithstanding this Executive Branch decision, both the House and the Senate agreed to H.Con.Res. 34 (103rd Congress) condemning commercial whaling.

After Norway announced in 1993 that it would resume commercial whaling, at least three conservation organizations asked consumers not to buy Norwegian products; these groups estimate the boycotts cost Norwegian companies between $30 million and $40 million in lost sales. (See Endnote 10.) However, others estimated that the losses from the boycotts totaled less than $5 million. Anti-whaling groups also threatened to boycott the 1994 Winter Olympics at Lillehammer, Norway, although this threat was not carried out. These boycotts and threats may actually have been more significant in strengthening a nationalist resolve of the Norwegians to continue whaling.

At its 1994 annual meeting, the IWC accepted in principle, but did not formally adopt, a Revised Management Procedure (RMP) recommended by its Scientific Committee as a scientifically based method for determining commercial whaling kill levels that would have a low probability of adversely affecting whale stocks. The RMP would be part of a broader Revised Management Scheme (RMS) that the United States and others believe should include an international system of observation, inspection, and enforcement. The IWC also endorsed its Scientific Committee's initial guidelines on how to conduct abundance surveys and analyze their results.

Early in 1995, Norwegian scientists raised concerns over the validity of their 1992 northeast Atlantic minke whale population estimate, which had been based on Norwegian data. After researchers discovered computer errors in the calculation of the 1992 population estimate, the Norwegians unilaterally reduced the abundance estimate from 86,700 to 69,600 animals, and lowered their 1995 minke commercial hunt quota from 301 to 232. Even though the IWC's Scientific Committee would not have a chance to review Norway's new population estimate until after the Norwegian season began, Norway chose not to postpone its 1995 season. When the IWC's Scientific Committee did meet in 1995, it did not endorse Norway's new estimate of 69,600 but only confirmed that the earlier estimate (86,700) was no longer valid. It subsequently scheduled workshops and an intersessional Committee meeting for early in 1996 to determine the acceptability of a new abundance estimate, to be based on summer 1995 survey data. An acceptable new abundance estimate, it was believed, would allow the RMP to be used to calculate a quota for Norway's scheduled 1996 commercial hunt.

In early May, 1996, Norway reported a new abundance estimate of 118,000 minke whales in the northeast and central Atlantic based on data from a summer 1995 survey using improved census methods, (See Endnote 11.) and announced that it had revised the commercial quota to 425 minke whales for the 1996 season. Shortly thereafter (on May 16), 23 Members of Congress sent President Clinton a letter objecting to Norway's continued whaling.

One month later, the IWC's Scientific Committee approved the new abundance estimate, reviewed by a special Abundance Estimate Working Group (AEWG, (See Endnote 12.) comprised of 2 scientists from Norway and 5 from non-whaling nations) as adequate for use in the RMP for computing catch limits. (See Endnote 13.) Some members of the Scientific Committee expressed concerns over the new estimate because its calculation was inconsistent with the Committee's 1995 guidelines. (See Endnote 14.)

On June 28, 1996, at the IWC's 1996 annual meeting in Aberdeen, Scotland, the IWC approved a resolution calling on Norway to reconsider its objection to the moratorium on commercial whaling, to halt all whaling under its jurisdiction, to enforce measures to prevent whalemeat smuggling, and to provide information on its whale product stockpiles. (See Endnote 15.) The IWC also approved a resolution urging Norway to maintain its ban on exporting whale products. Norwegian delegates protested that the IWC was overstepping its jurisdiction.

Norway completed its 2-month 1996 whaling season on July 29, during which it killed 388 minke whales, 37 fewer than its announced quota. The hunting period was twice extended by an additional week; environmental groups suggest that Norway's inability to meet its own quota indicates that the 1995 population estimate may have been too high. The Norwegians, however, attribute the shortfall to bad weather conditions.

On November 22 1996, Norway announced a 1997 commercial minke whale quota of 580 animals, an increase of 155 over the 1996 level. The actual harvest may total 617 if whalers are allowed to carry over the previous year's shortfall. This could prove highly controversial, because the IWC will not meet again until October 1997, so Norway's unilateral action will not be subject to IWC review until after the 1997 commercial hunt has ended. In addition, Norway will seek to transfer the listing of the northeast and central Atlantic minke whale stocks from Appendix I to Appendix II of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) at the biennial conference of parties to be held in June 1997 in Zimbabwe. (See Endnote 16.) This proposal is important to Norway, as the CITES Appendix I listing is the primary barrier to any resumption of whale product trade between Norway and Japan. (See Endnote 17.)

POLICY ISSUES

ECOLOGICAL ISSUES

Although some whale populations already may have been hunted nearly to extinction, the Norwegians maintain that they strongly believe in sustainable whaling in general and the conservation of northeast Atlantic minke whales in particular. As noted earlier, the latest abundance estimate, based on 1995 Norwegian survey data, indicates there are about 118,000 animals in the northeast and central Atlantic accessible to Norwegian whalers, and the Norwegians argue that these minke whales can be sustainably harvested. (See Endnote 18.) Others, however, question whether the IWC had sufficient time to adequately review and test the Norwegian Computer Center's program used to calculate the abundance estimate from the 1995 survey data, and whether additional analysis using alternative computer programs might yield a significantly lower estimate of abundance.

Norway has established its commercial quota using the RMP recommended by the IWC's Scientific Committee, abut has used abundance estimates provided by its own scientists when there was no consensus within the IWC's Scientific Committee. The RMP is to be used to calculate the number of whales that may be harvested without endangering populations of the species killed. The RMS has not been adopted due to continuing disagreement, principally by Norway and Japan, on international development of an international, non-flag state, system of observation and inspection to ensure compliance with quotas and other measures adopted by the IWC. (See Endnote 19.) In this regard, it is important to note that scientists in the former Soviet Union have made known large-scale illegal whaling under the previous system of flag-state enforcement.

While some insist that Norway's licensing of commercial whaling is a premature action that undermines the collective decision making authority of the IWC, the inability to resolve these questions concerning the RMS may reflect the desire by some IWC parties that any resumption of commercial whaling be prevented. (See Endnote 20.)

ETHICAL ISSUES

For some, the whaling issue raises ethical as well as ecological and political questions. Animal protection advocates protest that whales aren't simply "food animals," but are intelligent creatures with a right to life, and maintain that it is immoral to subject them to cruel, unnecessary slaughter. On the other hand, supporters of whaling point out that pigs also are deemed to be intelligent, and yet pork is widely consumed in many developed countries. Norwegians have argued that the anti-whaling countries are guilty of a form of cultural imperialism, and are seeking to impose their moral and ethical values on Norway and other countries that have whaled for centuries. Norwegian Foreign Minister Bjorn Tore Godal drew a parallel: "[i]magine India being in the position of threatening the U.S. with trade sanctions if it didn't accept the sanctity of the cow. The principle is the same." (See Endnote 21.) Animal protection groups counter that this is an apples-and-oranges comparison, as whales are wildlife, not livestock. They also argue that the continuation of whaling encourages poaching and illegal trade of wildlife.

Norwegians also note that their government requires that veterinarian-inspectors be aboard all whaling vessels toensure that whales are killed quickly and humanely; 60% of whales die instantaneously, they assert, and most others within minutes. However, whaling opponents claim that after a whale is struck by an exploding harpoon, it may take as long as 10 minutes to an hour for it to die.

Finally, Norwegians contrast their conservation-based whaling with the sports of fox hunting and bullfighting, still customary in several countries. Animal protection advocates counter that this comparison, however valid, still does not legitimatize the practice of commercial whaling; they suggest that, instead of whaling, Norwegian fishermen should cooperate with the tourism industry and sponsor whale-watching cruises. This activity, they argue, could prove to be at least as profitable as whaling.

POLITICAL ISSUES

Many policymakers wonder why, in the face of harsh and continued international criticism, Norway insists upon exercising its right to continue whaling. Norwegians respond that their whaling tradition traces back to the Ice Age, and is therefore an important part of their cultural -- if not economic -- heritage. Norwegian leaders have likened this centuries-long tradition to those of aboriginal peoples: "[Prime Minister] Brundtland said her country. . . conducts only coastal whaling by small boats -- akin to whale hunting by Alaska natives." (See Endnote 22.)

Norwegians distinguish their coastal whaling from pelagic factory ship whaling, which they halted decades ago. Their current whaling "fleet" consists of about three dozen family-owned fishing vessels. Most of the hunting is conducted above the Arctic Circle, where whaling is still an important income supplement for some villages. Norway's whaling situation is arguably analogous to the support shown by other countries for programs to ensure the continuation of family farming in their societies.

Whaling is not generally regarded as one of the make-or-break issues in Norwegian politics; nevertheless, from a political standpoint, it would be fairly unrepresentative for Norwegian office-holders to oppose whaling. A 1992 survey found that 75% of Norwegians supported regulated whaling; (See Endnote 23.) in addition, sustainable whaling is backed by all the major political parties. (See Endnote 24.) Because many Norwegians believe there is reasonably clear scientific evidence that some minke whales may be harvested without harming stock levels, it would be difficult for the government to forbid whaling without resorting to moralistic or ethical arguments. Former Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland strongly supported science-based conservation. Norwegians maintain that, as a matter of principle, all of a country's natural resources may be used, so long as such use is done sustainably.

Some have argued that domestic politics may have influenced Norway's decision to resume whaling in 1993. (See Endnote 25.) There is strong support for whaling in the towns and villages of the far north. The northerners, who account for about 11% of the country's population, tend to be somewhat insular in their outlook, and immune to international pressures. For example, in the November 1994 national referendum, they voted in large numbers against Norwegian entry into the European Union (EU). (See Endnote 26.) Despite concessions which their government had wrung for them during initial negotiations with the EU, Norwegian farmers and fishermen in the north feared a further erosion of their subsidies and transfer of control over their resources from Oslo to Brussels. Because there is strong voter turnout in the northern regions, it was politically advantageous for former Prime Minister Brundtland -- and her ruling Labor Party -- to speak out in defense of whaling. Norway is scheduled to hold its next national elections in the fall of 1997.

Finally, it is quite possible that Norway's national pride and sense of independence play a role in its refusal to budge on the whaling issue. (See Endnote 27.) By choosing not to join the European Union in 1994, Norwegians demonstrated that they are not averse to standing alone.

On the economic side, Norwegian officials claim that their country's yearly expenditures for educational and research programs associated with whaling exceed the value of the entire annual whale catch. However, some analysts suggest that, over the long term, Norway's insistence on preserving its right to whale may in fact have an economic basis. Even though Norway currently kills a limited number of whales and consumes most of the whalemeat, a certain amount of the whalemeat and most of the blubber (which Norway does not consume) has been placed in storage. In Japan, whalemeat and blubber are a traditional part of the diet in some regions; given the sharp reduction in worldwide supplies, the Japanese would pay a premium for Norwegian whale products, if trade were permitted. The media have reported illegal attempts to ship Norwegian whalemeat to Japan. (See Endnote 28.) Observers have suggested that some Norwegians may be storing blubber and whalemeat in the hope that this potentially lucrative market will eventually reopen.

ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

As the debate over commercial whaling continues, there are several options the Administration and Congress may consider vis-a-vis Norway. However, any U.S. decision on Norwegian whaling will not be made in a vacuum, but must acknowledge possible implications for U.S. policy toward Japan, Russia, and other nations that also may be considering whaling. The three most prominent and likely options are:

INVOKE PELLY AMENDMENT SANCTIONS

The most drastic measure the United States might take to apply pressure on Norway would be for the President to impose Pelly Amendment trade sanctions, a step which has yet to be taken in response to whaling concerns. To date, the U.S. government has shied away from this policy tool for several possible reasons. First, imposing sanctions would almost certainly cause a serious rift in political relations with Norway, which has long been a close ally of the United States. Secondly, the Pelly Amendment must be implemented in a manner that is consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and many analysts believe that Norway would challenge the United States before the World Trade Organization if sanctions were imposed. Thirdly, while the economic impact may be small for the United States, it could be significant and serious for Norway. (See Endnote 29.) Fourthly, U.S. sanctions might lead other countries to restrict their trade with Norwegians, intensifying their economic pain. Finally, given Norway's demonstrated penchant for independent action, there is little guarantee Oslo would bow to trade restrictions.

ACCEPT A SCIENCE-BASED SOLUTION

Another approach would be for the United States to accept the practice of sustainable whaling. However, other policy goals would be met if the compromise included other provisions, such as the enlistment of non-flag state international observers, new enforcement powers for the IWC, and perhaps, measures to guard against export of whalemeat and other whale products. Such a solution might have a steep domestic political price, both in the United States and other countries, as it would likely be staunchly opposed by environmental and animal protection groups, as well as by many Members of Congress.

CONTINUE THE "GOOD FAITH DIALOGUE"

This option, which has been followed under the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, would continue to buy time for all parties involved in the debate, but would likely also frustrate both whaling proponents and members of the environmental community, many of whom believe the discussion has gone on long enough.

ENDNOTES

(1) Historically, U.S. whalers were major participants in this industry.

(2) U.S. Dept. of Commerce. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. National Marine Fisheries Service. Endangered Whales: Status Update. Washington, DC: June 1991. 52 p.

(3) All regulations (e.g., quotas, moratoria, etc.) are contained in a Schedule appended to the ICRW. Amendments to the Schedule must be approved by three-quarters of the members voting.

(4) Those who prefer the term "zero quota period" stress that what the IWC agreed to was a pause that would allow commercial whaling to resume once an improved management system had been agreed upon.

(5) For further information, see CRS Report 90-283 ENR, Whale Conservation.

(6) Japan, the USSR, and Peru also lodged objections to the commercial whaling moratorium. Japan and Peru later withdrew their objections.

(7) Norway and other countries have also killed minke whales for scientific research purposes. Whaling for scientific purposes is acknowledged as a sovereign right of a contracting government to the ICRW.

(8) Minke whales are relatively small (5 metric tons, 9 meters long) baleen (i.e., filter feeding) whales. Although this species consumes planktonic animals (i.e., small shrimp-like crustaceans referred to as "krill") in southern oceans, minke whales feed opportunistically upon both pelagic crustaceans and schooling fishes, including capelin, herring, sand lance/sand eels, cod, pollack, and others in northern oceans. See: Jonsgrd, ge. "The Food of Minke Whales (Balaenoptera acutorostrata) in Northern North Atlantic Waters." Report of the International Whaling Commission, 32 (1980-1981): 259-262.

(9) Norway's 1993 commercial minke whale kill was 157 animals; in 1994, it was 206; and in 1995, 218.

(10) According to U.S. Department of Commerce statistics, Norway's total exports in 1993 were approximately $32.1 billion.

(11) The difference in the stock estimates may be attributed to different methodology as well as possible stock growth.

(12) The AEWG was established by the Scientific Committee in 1995 to address concerns with how the 1992 abundance estimate was calculated from the 1989 survey data.

(13) This estimate was based on the intersessional work, but has not been reviewed by the IWC's Scientific Committee.

(14) In 1995, the Scientific Committee decided that population models should be subjected to rigorous testing. Norway, the designer of the 1995 population model, claimed it was unable to perform the tests due to time constraints.

(15) In 1995, the IWC had passed a resolution urging Norway to reconsider its objection to the moratorium and halt all whaling.

(16) A Norwegian motion to take similar action was defeated at the 1994 CITES meeting by a vote of 48 against and 16 in favor, with 52 abstentions.

(17) For more information on CITES, see CRS Report 95-674 ENR, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species: Its Past and Future.

(18) Using the same methodology applied under the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 1361 et seq.) for calculating the potential biological removal (PBR) levels for marine mammals allowable for commercial fishing operations, a reasonable PBR for a stock of 118,000 minke whales can be calculated. Since the PBR process is designed to be very conservative, the Norwegian quotas may be considered quite conservative from an ecological standpoint.

(19) A key issue is who will pay the costs of international observers -- the whaling nations or the IWC.

(20) The United States and other nations have been accused of stalling agreement on details of various aspects of the RMS. Some nations may believe that requiring whaling nations to pay for international observers might discourage a few of them, including Norway, from continuing their whaling.

(21) Moseley, Ray. "Defying Global Ban, Norway Still Hunts Whales." Chicago Tribune. February 22, 1994. p. 1.

(22) "Whaling Dispute Puts US in Middle." Washington Post. May 18, 1994. p. A4.

(23) Freeman, Milton. "Gallup on Public Attitudes to Whales and Whaling." In: 11 Essays on Whales and Man. High North Alliance, Bde, Norway, 1993. The same study found that 57% of Americans opposed whaling.

(24) Interview with Karsten Klepsvik, Deputy Chief of Mission, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Washington, DC, on June 14, 1996.

(25) Bilger, Burkhard. "Forbidden Flesh." Earthwatch. May/June, 1994. p. 15.

(26) However, at 47.7% in favor of joining and 52.3% against, the total vote was fairly close.

(27) Norway achieved full political independence in 1905, when it peacefully severed its union with Sweden.

(28) Norway Tried to Smuggle Tons of Whale Meat to Japan. Reuters. April 25, 1996.

(29) In 1995, Norway enjoyed a $1.8 billion trade surplus with the United States; U.S. exports to Norway were $1.3 billion, while imports from Norway were $3.1 billion -- nearly 10% of Norway's total foreign sales, but less than half of one percent of total U.S. imports.