Agroterrorism and Homeland Security
Jim Monke

The potential of terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) has increasingly captured the attention of national security analysts, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. In this context, agroterrorism is defined as the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing economic losses, and/or undermining stability. Agroterrorism is a subset of the more general issues of terrorism and bioterrorism (see CRS Report RL32521(pdf)).

Although agroterrorism has been recognized as a possible threat for many years, the issue has received increased attention over the past year. Two bills, S. 427 and S. 430, have been introduced in the 108th Congress to improve preparedness for agroterrorism. On November 19, 2003, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held heari ngs on agroterrorism. On January 30, 2004, the White House released a homeland security presidential directive, HSPD-9, to establish a national policy to protect against terrorist attacks on agriculture and food systems. On December 17, 2003, HSPD-7 added agriculture to the list of critical infrastructure for protection against terrorist attack.

Background on the Threat

Attacks against agriculture are not new. In modern times, however, using biological weapons against agricultural targets has remained mostly a theoretical consideration. In fact, biological weapons have rarely been used against crops or livestock despite extensive research on the issue. With the ratification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1972, many countries, including the United States, stopped military development of biological weapons and destroyed stockpiles.

Many parts of the production chain in the food supply may be potentially susceptible to attack with a biological weapon. For example, terrorists may have unmonitored access to geographically remote crop fields and livestock feedlots. Diseases may infect herds more rapidly in modern concentrated confinement livestock operations than in open pastures. An undetected disease may spread rapidly when livestock are transported between farms or to processing plants.

Traditionally, the first defense against the introduction of livestock or plant diseases has been to try to identify and stop them at the border. However, if an agroterrorist attack were to occur, keeping the disease from spreading and inflicting significant economic damage will depend on quick actions from alert and informed farmers and disease specialists.

These planning efforts are built on four elements: (1) education and awareness, (2) prevention and preparedness (security, border inspection, disaster plans, agency coordination and cooperation), (3) early detection and laboratory testing, and (4) incident response (countermeasures and eradication).

The results of an agroterrorist attack may include major economic crises in the agricultural and food industries, loss of confidence in government, and possibly human casualties. Direct economic losses can include the value of lost production, the cost of destroying diseased or potentially diseased products, and the cost of containment (vaccines, drugs, diagnostics, pesticides and veterinary services). Indirect costs can include lost export markets, erosion of consumer confidence, and slower sales by businesses dependent on agriculture (farm input supplies, transportation, food manufacturing, retail grocery, and food service).

Depending on the disease and means of transmission, the potential for economic damage depends on a number of factors such as the disease agent, location of the attack, rate of transmission, geographical dispersion, how long it remains undetected, availability of countermeasures or quarantines, and incident response plans. Potential costs are difficult to estimate and can vary widely based on compounding assumptions. USDA officials have estimated that a single agroterrorist attack on the livestock industry using a highly infective agent could cost the U.S. economy between $10 billion and $30 billion.

Even though no foreign terrorist attacks on crops or livestock have occurred in the U.S., government agencies and private businesses have not taken the threat lightly. Because of the importance of brand names in marketing, many agribusinesses have prepared response plans or added security measures to protect their product line, looking at issues from input sources to retail distribution. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, biosecurity is an increasing priority among food manufacturers, merchandisers, retailers, and farmers nationwide.

Issues in the 108th Congress

Preparedness. Two bills have been introduced in the 108th Congress regarding preparedness for an agroterrorist attack. Introduced in February 2003, S. 427 (Agriculture Security Assistance Act) and S. 430 (Agriculture Security Preparedness Act) are complementary bills sponsored by Senator Akaka and cosponsored by Senator Lautenberg. The bills address different aspects of agroterrorism preparedness. S. 427 provides funding for state and local preparedness, and creates awareness programs and grants for farmers. S. 430 seeks to improve coordination between USDA and other federal agencies, and provides for a review of federal laboratory capacity and legal authorities, among other things.

If enacted, these bills would appear to provide more concrete Congressional instructions and budget authorizations for agroterrorism preparedness than the policy instituted under the White House's HSPD-9. However, similar results may occur if the presidential directive is implemented successfully. It is worth noting that the presidential directives facilitating agroterrorism preparedness did not exist when the bills were introduced.

Agricultural Border Inspections. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) transferred approximately 2,680 inspectors from the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Bureau of Customs and Border Inspection (CBP). However, because of its scientific expertise, USDA retains a significant presence in border inspection. APHIS continues to set agricultural inspection policies, pre-clear certain commodities, and inspect passengers and cargo entering the mainland from Hawaii and Puerto Rico. USDA is also statutorily charged in section 421 (e)(2)(A) of the Act to "supervise" the training of CBP inspectors, in consultation with DHS.

One face at the border. Under the new CBP cross-training initiative (also known as "one face at the border"), CBP inspectors will be trained to perform inspections in all three areas of customs, immigration and agriculture. Previously, APHIS training for new agricultural inspectors was a nine-week course, with science background prerequisites. However, the DHS-announced training program has only 12-16 hours for agriculture in a 71-day course covering customs, immigration and agriculture. CBP has since announced a class of inspectors called agricultural specialists who will staff, primarily, secondary inspection stations. These specialists will be former APHIS inspectors who decide not to convert to CBP generalist inspectors. However, the future size of the agricultural specialist corps remains unknown, as well as how these inspectors will be replaced or deployed. Thus, primary agricultural inspections (the first line of defense for agricultural security) may be conducted by cross-trained (former customs or immigration) inspectors with limited agricultural training. Critics of the plan say that a large number of unnecessary referrals to secondary inspection may occur, and forbidden products or agricultural pests may go undetected and allowed to enter the U.S. Congressional agriculture committees are concerned whether enough attention is being devoted to agricultural inspections by DHS, and whether the U.S. will be as safe from the introduction of foreign pests as it was under the previous inspection system.

Oversight and implementation of new FDA rules. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (P.L.107-188) expanded Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority over food manufacturing and imports. The agency was instructed to implement new rules by December 12, 2003, for (1) registration of food processors, (2) food facility record-keeping and inspection, and (3) prior notice of food imports. Proposed rules were issued in the spring 2003 followed by a comment period. Final rules were issued in October 2003 for registration of food facilities and prior notice of imports. The final rule for record keeping is forthcoming.

CRS Products

CRS Report RL32521(pdf), Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness
CRS Report RL31853, Food Safety Issues in the 108th Congress

Other Resources

Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, University of Minnesota.
Council of State Governments, Agricultural Terrorism in the Midwest.
RAND report on agroterrorism (Peter Chalk, 2004).

CRS Contact: Jim Monke (7-9664)

Page last updated August 17, 2004.

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