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RL30024: Global Climate Change Policy:
|Problem||Concerned that human activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the natural greenhouse effect, and that this will result on average in an additional warming of the Earth's surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind ... (preamble)|
|Planning/Strategy||Each of these Parties shall adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs ... (Art. 4, 4(a)).||The ... National Energy Policy Plan ... shall include a least-cost energy strategy ... designed to achieve [among other goals] ... the stabilization and eventual reduction in the generation of greenhouse gases ... (sec. 1602(a)).|
|Precautionary||The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures ... (Art. 3, 3).|
|Policy Options||All Parties ... shall ... Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national ... programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases... (Art. 4, 1(b)).||... the Secretary [of Energy] shall transmit a report to Congress containing a comparative assessment of alternative policy mechanisms for reducing the generation of greenhouse gases (sec. 1604).|
|Least Cost||... policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost (Art. 3, 3).||In developing the least-cost energy strategy, the Secretary [of Energy] shall take into consideration the economic, energy, social, environmental, and competitive costs and benefits, including costs and benefits for jobs, of his choices (sec. 1602(a)).|
|Developed Nations Take Lead||... the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change... (Art. 3, 1).|
|Technology Development/ Transfer||All Parties ... shall ... Promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases ... (Art. 4, 1(c)).||The Secretary [of Energy] ... shall establish a technology transfer program to carry out the [following] purposes [among others]: ... encourage the export of United States technologies ... that substantially reduce environmental pollutants, including greenhouse gases; develop markets for United States technologies ... that substantially reduce environmental pollutants, including greenhouse gases; provide financial assistance by the Federal Government to foster greater participation by United States firms in the financing, ownership, design, construction, or operation of technologies or services that substantially reduce environmental pollutants, including greenhouse gases (sec. 1608).|
|Financial Assistance to Developing Nations||The developed country Parties ... shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet ... costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obligations ... and shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance ... the transfer of, or access to, environment-ally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties ... (Art. 4, 5).||The Secretary of the Treasury ... shall establish a Global Climate Change Response Fund to act as a mechanism for United States contributions to assist global efforts in mitigating and adapting to global climate change (sec. 1609(a)).|
|Inventory; Research and Monitoring||All Parties ... shall ... Develop, periodically update, publish and make
available to the Conference of the Parties, ... national inventories of anthropo-genic
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases ... (Art. 4, 1(a)).
Promote and cooperate in scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and other research, systematic observation and development of data archives related to the climate system and intended to further the understanding and to reduce or eliminate the remaining uncertainties regarding the causes, effects, magnitude and timing of climate change and the economic and social consequences
of various response strategies (Art. 4, 1(g)).
|The Secretary [of Energy] ... shall develop ... an inventory of the
[annual] national aggregate emissions of each greenhouse gas for ... the baseline period
of 1987 through 1990....
The Administrator of the Energy Information Administration shall annually update and analyze such inventory using available data. This subsection does not provide any new data collection authority (sec. 1605(a)).
|Emissions Reduction||[The developed country] Parties shall communicate ... information on its policies and measures ... with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels ... anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (Art. 4, 2(b)).||The ... National Energy Policy Plan ... shall include a ... strategy ... designed to achieve ... the stabilization and eventual reduction in the generation of greenhouse gases ... (sec. 1602(a)).|
|Education||Promote and cooperate in education, training and public awareness related to climate change and encourage the widest participation in this process, including that of non-governmental organizations (Art. 4, 1(i)).|
Results: Action Plans
The notion that the U.S. could meet modest CO2 emission reduction goals at little or no cost underlies many of the global climate change initiatives during the Bush and Clinton Administrations, including the Bush Administration's "No Regrets" policy and 1992 Climate Action Plan, and the Clinton Administration's 1994 and 1997 Climate Action Plans.(9) This approach to climate change policy allowed the two Administrations to avoid requesting regulatory authority from Congress to implement a climate change policy. This left them with the option of undertaking governmental implementing actions that could be done administratively, unless Congress legislated otherwise, and creating incentives for private industry to voluntarily undertake emissions reduction initiatives.
The Bush Administration's National Action Plan: "No Regrets". To meet the obligation of the FCCC, the Bush Administration issued in December, 1992, the first U.S. plan, National Action Plan for Global Climate Change.(10) This plan consisted primarily of (1) estimating U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases and (2) describing then-existing activities affecting them. These activities were dominated by research initiatives supplemented by programs proposed in the National Energy Strategy(11) or anticipated as resulting from the recent passage of EPACT, along with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) various pollution prevention, "green" initiatives begun in 1991.(12) These mostly voluntary initiatives, led by EPA's "Green Lights" program, formed the core of the Bush Administration's "No Regrets" policy and followed the recommendations of the 1991 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report for countries to consider taking actions on global climate change that were:
As codified by the national action plan, the combination of EPA and DOE programs were forecasted to hold U.S. greenhouse gas emissions at near their 1990 levels in the year 2000. Emissions were projected to rise by only 1.4%-6% over that time period, compared to a projected rise of 13% under a "business as usual" scenario. Table 2 summarizes the principle actions the Bush Administration envisioned and the anticipated reductions in greenhouse gases in millions of metric tons of carbon-equivalent (MMTCE).(13)
Table 2: Selected Major Reduction Strategies Listed by the
Bush Action Plan
|Program||Carbon Reduction (MMTCE)||Percent of Total||Gas Reduced|
|Commercial/industrial "Green Lights," DSM, standards||17.0-50.1||11.3-25.1%||CO2|
|Energy Star Computers||5.5||3.7-2.8%||CO2|
|"America the Beautiful" and other forestry programs||5-9||3.3-4.5%||CO2 (sequestration)|
|Livestock Waste Lagoons||7||4.7-3.5%||CH4|
|Reducing N2O from Nylon Manufacturing||8-12||5.3-6.0%||N2O|
aBased on a projected reduction of 150-200 MMTCE as presented in Table 12 of Bush National Action Plan (adjusted for CH4 at GWP of 22).
Basically, the Bush plan was a "compendium" of what was then known about greenhouse gas emissions and of existing or planned domestic actions that affected those gases. The primary reason for these actions were to conserve energy and to reduce air pollution -- any global climate change benefits would be a bonus. (Thus exemplifying "no regrets" -- the action is one that is undertaken for other reasons.) The goal of the Bush plan was to present a baseline that "should assist in measuring and evaluating existing policies and measures and in establishing a basis for future actions." The plan expressly "does not seek to identify or recommend additional policies and measures that might be taken." Underlying this approach, it appeared, was the presumption that uncertainties about global climate change were too great to justify actions beyond research except for so-called "no-regrets" initiatives justifiable on other grounds, such as selected energy conservation measures. Reflecting this attitude, the Bush plan was explicit about a number of uncertainties, for example, in using two estimates of the global warming potential (GWP) for methane; additionally, the Bush plan discussed adaptive measures before discussing mitigation measures.
The Clinton Administration's National Action Plans: Industrial Strength "No Regrets". Following a June 1993 White House Conference on Global Climate Change, the Clinton Administration in October 1993 issued a new plan, The Climate Change Action Plan.(14) This plan explicitly set a goal of reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels in the year 2000; and laid out of series of nearly 50 program activities to achieve the goal, including both enhancement of earlier programs and new, mostly voluntary, initiatives. It was not submitted to the FCCC, but was described as the core of a forthcoming submission to meet the obligations of the convention. In March 1994, the Administration issued a technical supplement that documented the assumptions and parameters used in developing the supporting analysis for the plan.(15) Also in 1994 the Administration submitted its Climate Action Report to the convention, and a revised version was submitted in 1997.
Philosophically, the Clinton Action Plans were similar to that developed under the Bush Administration. Both were designed to foster market choices that would conserve energy, increase energy efficiency, and encourage natural gas use. Both were also designed to strengthen selected regulatory standards that concomitantly also reduced greenhouse gas emissions -- such as landfill regulations that curtail methane releases. As indicated in table 3, several actions in the 1993 Clinton plan expanded programs listed in the Bush plan by augmenting funding or technical support to increase anticipated reductions. Other Clinton proposals were new; examples included a "Golden Carrot" program to induce efficiency improvements of industrial equipment, a renewable energy consortium, a program to encourage employers to replace parking subsidies with cash incentives for solo commuting, and a program to promote more efficient nitrogen fertilizer use.
Table 3: Selected Major Reduction Strategies Under the 1993
Clinton Action Plan
|Program||Carbon Reduction (MMTCE)||Percent of Total||Gas Reduced|
|Form "Golden Carrot" Market Pull Partnerships/Enhanced Residential Appliance Standards||11.8||10.9%||CO2|
|Create a "Motor Challenge" Program||8.8||8.1%||CO2|
|Reform Federal Tax Subsidy for Employer-provided Parking/Adopt a Transportation System Efficiency Strategy/Promote Greater Use of Telecommuting||6.6||6.1%||CO2|
|Accelerate Source Reduction Pollution Prevention, and Recycling||9.2||8.5%||CO2 (5.0 by sequestration)|
|Reduce Use of Fertilizers/Reduce Use of Pesticides||7.2||6.6%||CO2 - 2.7
N2O - 4.5
|Narrow Use of High GWP Chemicals Using the Clean Air Act and Production Stewardship to Reduce Emissions||5.0||4.6%||HFC, PFC|
|Create Partnerships with Manufacturers of HFC-22 to Eliminate HCFC-23 Emissions||5.0||4.6%||HFC|
Under the 1993 Clinton plan, total greenhouse gas emissions were projected to return to their 1990 levels by the year 2000, although CO2 emissions alone would rise about 2 percent. By 1997, the projected greenhouse gas emission reductions of the Clinton plan was revised downward to 76 MMTCE, from 109 MMTCE in the 1993 plan. In addition, the baseline for greenhouse gas emissions in the year 2000 was increased by 157 MMTCE from that projected in 1993. Thus, rather than returning emissions to their 1990 levels in the year 2000, the 1997 plan projected a 188 MMTCE increase in emissions, or 13% above 1990 levels.(16)
The Administration blamed this failure to reduce emissions in 2000 to the 1990 level primarily on unanticipated economic growth and on Congress not fully funding the programs.(17) Despite this, the basic rationale of the Clinton plan remained: the plan "combines an array of public-private partnerships to stimulate the deployment of existing energy-efficient technologies and accelerate the introduction of innovative technologies. The goal of these programs is to cut CO2 emissions, while enhancing productivity domestically and U.S. competitiveness aboard."(18) The echo of the 1991 NAS report was clear: the cost to control greenhouse gas emissions would net out to zero, or even save money, depending on how the benefits from increased efficiency were estimated.
Kyoto and S.Res. 98
A central component of the FCCC was its establishment of a conference of parties (COP) to negotiate further agreements to counter global climate change.(19) The first two COPs were held in Berlin in 1995 and 1996.(20) At COP-1, several industrialized countries, including the United States, expressed concern that newly industrializing countries, such as Brazil and China, would continue to be classified as non-annex 1 countries -- i.e., developing countries, exempt from possible future legally binding reduction requirements -- despite their projected large increases in greenhouse gas emissions in the future. This issue of exempting such countries from future binding reduction requirements took on heightened importance when ministerial participants at COP-2 signed a declaration calling for "legally binding mid-term targets." Such targets were the subject of COP-3, held in Kyoto in December 1997.(21)
In anticipation of the Kyoto negotiations, the U.S. Senate debated the appropriate U.S. position vis a vis any legally binding agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. On July 25, 1997, the Senate voted 95-0 to approve Senate Resolution 98 (S.Res. 98), expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the conditions under which the United States should become a signatory to any international agreement on greenhouse gases under the FCCC.(22) Specifically, the resolution states that the U.S. should not sign any agreement limiting developed countries' greenhouse gas emission (e.g., the U.S.) unless that agreement also includes specific schedules to limit developing countries' greenhouse gas emissions over the same period. In addition, no agreement should be signed that would "result in serious harm to the economy of the United States."
S.Res. 98 also states that any agreement sent to the Senate for advice and consent should include a detailed discussion of required legislative and regulatory actions to implement the treaty and a cost analysis of an implementation strategy. These conditions for Senate consideration of a treaty illustrate the Senate's concern about the cost of any agreement to the U.S. economy and consumers, the competitive effects on U.S. trade, and the environmental effectiveness of a treaty that exempts increasingly important greenhouse emitting developing countries. By requiring re-analysis of the costs of implementing binding reduction requirements, the Senate was in effect calling for a reexamination of the NAS report's argument that greenhouse gas emissions could be reduced at modest cost.
That the Kyoto Protocol does not meet the conditions of Senate Resolution 98 is not in dispute: it does not bind developing countries to any schedule of reductions.(23) The Clinton Administration has stated on several occasions that it will not send the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate until at least some developing countries commit to binding goals. Argentina was the first developing country to voluntarily make such a commitment. The Administration has not indicated how many developing countries will have to follow Argentina's lead before it would submit the Kyoto Protocol for Senate consideration. For many critics, no commitment may be comprehensive until the developing world's largest emitters, China and India, sign on.
Stalemate: Conflicting Cost Perspectives
In the face of scientific uncertainty, congressional debate with respect to beginning a mandatory CO2 reduction program can be categorized by the three-Cs: Cost, Competitiveness, and Comprehensiveness.
Questions about the Low-cost Perspective. The fundamental assumption that has changed between the U.S. ratification of the FCCC and the current delay in the Administration submitting the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate concerns costs. As noted above, the ratification of the FCCC was based at least partially on the premise that significant reductions could be achieved at little or no cost. This assumption helped to reduce concern some had (including those of the Bush Administration) that the treaty could have deleterious effects on U.S. competitiveness -- a significant consideration because developing countries are treated differently from developed countries under the FCCC. Further ameliorating this concern, compliance with the treaty was voluntary. While the United States could "aim" to reduce its emissions in line with the FCCC's goal, if the effort indeed involved substantial costs, the United States could fail to reach the goal without incurring any penalty under the treaty. Indeed, the United States, along with most of the world, will fail to meet the goal set at Rio.
The Kyoto Protocol, if ratified by the Senate, would change the commitment from a voluntary one (that the United States could choose to fall short of without penalty) to a binding commitment (for which the consequences of a shortfall are currently unspecified). This possibility of failing to comply with a binding commitment intensifies one's perspective on potential costs of the U.S. global climate change policy: How confident can one be in the claim that carbon reductions can be achieved at little or no cost? If one has little confidence in this conclusion, the potential for substantial costs lead to concerns about competitiveness and the inclusion or exclusion of developing countries (comprehensiveness). As noted earlier, the competitiveness issue arises because the Kyoto Protocol only places binding reductions on industrialized countries; the newly industrialized and other third world countries face few or no costs under the Protocol. As Congressman John Dingell testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S.Res. 98:
[W]ho is representing America's interests? The question I think underneath that is the one that you expressed, Mr. Chairman, and that my good friend Senator Byrd expressed. Are we setting the United States up for an economic fiasco? Are we going to assume burdens that no one else in the world is assuming?...The developing countries are scot-free. We do not have a single binding commitment from them.(24)
A number of economic analyses have intensified this concern about costs. It is estimated that to meet the U.S. commitment in the Kyoto Agreement, "business as usual" emissions in 2010 will need to be reduced by 390 to 660 million metric tons of carbon equivalent per year(25); a number of economic analyses(26)peg the cost at between $50 and$300 a ton, depending on the degree of emissions trading that is achievable. Costs of this magnitude give an annual price tag of roughly $20 billion to $200 billion. Even accepting the Administration's cost estimate of between $14 and $23 a ton (roughly, $5.5 billion to $15 billion per year), the potential cost of meeting the binding reduction commitment of Kyoto causes some to pause to question the NAS conclusion.(27)
This pause is magnified by concerns about the comprehensiveness of the Protocol. Not only could the costs be high, any environmental benefits from reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by developed countries (including the United States) may be negated by emissions growth in developing countries. Noting that China is projected to surpass the U.S. in carbon emissions by the year 2015, but would have no binding commitments under Kyoto, Senator Byrd asked the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, during hearings on S.Res. 98:
What good does it do for the United States and other developed nations to work feverishly to plug the holes that we have drilled in the bottom of the boat over the past decades while at the same time the developing nations will be drilling holes, larger holes, at the other end just as fast as we plug them on our end? Be assured that the global boat will sink just as rapidly and we are all going to be in for a long, long swim.(28)
It is often easy for a country to lead when little or no costs are involved. However, with some questioning the costs assumptions that previously guided U.S. policy, the willingness, or the wisdom, of leading the world with greenhouse gas reductions is also questioned.
Impact on "No Regrets" Programs. The emergence of the perspective that carbon reductions can only be achieved at great cost results in two contending camps -- one believing that carbon reductions can be achieved at little or no cost and the other believing that costs will disrupt the U.S. economy with little environmental benefit. Starting from different presumptions, each tends to be suspicious of the motivations and policy conclusions of the other. Besides the obvious dispute over whether the United States ought to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the differing perspectives have intensified congressional review of existing programs designed to meet U.S. obligations under the FCCC, which the United States has ratified. Thus those who presume reductions can be achieved at little cost see such programs as justified by conserving energy or reducing pollution and have "no regrets" about supporting them. But those who fear great costs are worried that such programs are actually a "backdoor" effort to implement Kyoto, which has not been ratified by the United States or entered into force, and represent a first step along a path of escalating costs.(29)
As noted earlier, some of the energy conservation and pollution reduction programs that also reduce greenhouse gas emissions have explicit statutory basis, particularly EPACT. However, other programs represent Bush and Clinton Administration initiatives taken as part of either the National Energy Strategy (Bush), or one of the National Action Plans under the FCCC (both Bush and Clinton). Although these programs are consistent with the U.S. commitment to a voluntary reduction of emissions under the FCCC, they have not been explicitly authorized by Congress. This situation has led to the appropriations process as the primary review mechanism for such programs, and several contentious debates over proposed riders to prevent the Administration from somehow implementing Kyoto without seeking Senate approval of the Protocol.(30)
Conclusion: Battle of Policy Perspectives(31)
Up to the Kyoto Protocol, the thrust of U.S. policy, as represented by its national action plans, focused on technological and efficiency improvements(32) -- improvements that promised to reduce carbon emissions at little or no costs, and with "no regrets." As noted earlier, the 1997 Climate Change Action Plan continues to base the Administration's climate change policy on technology development and efficiency improvement as a means of reducing emissions at little or no costs. This position was reiterated in the President's 1998 $6 billion Climate Change Technology Initiative. As summarized by National Economic Council Chairman Gene Sperling with the introduction of the President's initiative:
We think that this package is a very good example of what we spoke about when we said that there were win-win opportunities for positive incentives that would clearly show how we can address the issue of climate change and strengthen our economy at the same time.(33)
For those who hold to this technological perspective, the ratification of Kyoto Protocol would improve the possibilities for improved efficiency and technology by creating a stronger market for such innovations. They see concerns that increased costs would destroy U.S. competitiveness as unfounded; indeed, they see increased efficiency and innovation as improving U.S. competitiveness. They contend that United States not only can afford to take the lead in carbon reductions (negating the comprehensiveness concern), but should do so in order to increase its technological leadership as well as to provide an example to the third world.
To those who are skeptical of the low-cost assumption but who may have been willing to accept such a scenario when it was voluntary, the above scenarios appear overly optimistic. Looking at economic analyses from various sources, they do not see the potential economic costs of Kyoto resulting in commensurate environmental benefits, particularly with the developing world excluded from controls. From their perspective, the reward does not appear to be worth the risk, and until it does, the country would be better off keeping its options open rather than moving down an unsure and potentially very expensive track.
Where does this leave the debate at this time? The focus on costs represents an attempt to determine whether action is prudent, given the uncertainty of the risk. Besides the scientific uncertainty involved in global climate change, the Kyoto Protocol adds an additional risk because of its exclusion of developing countries. Will developing countries follow the developed countries in reducing or retarding the growth in their emissions? How much might the United States pay before finding out? If one believes that the costs of greenhouse gas emissions reductions is modest, these questions are not as risky as they first appear. In particular, if one is following a "no regrets" policy, then actions on global climate changes are justified on other grounds, so there is no risk at all with what the developing world may or may not do.
However, if one perceives substantial costs from reducing carbon emissions, the uncertainty about any benefits raises serious questions as to the prudence of such action. From such a policy perspective, the Kyoto Protocol as it stands appears fatally flawed, and the United States should avoid any effort to implement it.
This clash of perspectives is likely to ensure that costs remain a pivotal issue, along with scientific uncertainty, as the global climate change policy debate continues.
3. (back) For a review of the negotiations, see Susan R. Fletcher, Earth Summit Summary: United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Brazil, 1992, CRS Report 92-374. For previous activities, see Wayne A. Morrissey, Global Climate Change: A Concise History of Negotiations and Chronology of Major Activities Preceding The 1992 U.N. Framework Convention, CRS Report 98-43.
6. (back) For a summary of provisions, see Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division, Science Policy Research Division, and Economics Division, Energy Policy Act of 1992: Summary and Implications, CRS Report 93-134.
9. (back) On the "no regrets" policy of the Bush Administration, see: C. Boyden Gray and David B. Rivkin, Jr., "A "No Regrets" Environmental Policy," Foreign Policy, summer 1991, pp. 47-65; for the various action plans, see: U.S. Department of State, National Action Plan for Global Climate Change, Department of State Publication 10026, December 1992; U.S. Department of State, Climate Action Report, Department of State Publication, 1994; and U.S. Department of State, Climate Action Report, Department of State Publication 10496, July 1997.
12. (back) For a summary of these and other voluntary pollution control programs, see James E. McCarthy, Voluntary Programs to Reduce Pollution, CRS Report 95-817. When challenged on the explicit statutory basis for these voluntary programs, EPA cites several authorities, including the Clean Air Act (section 103), the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (sections 6602 and 6606), and the Global Climate Protection Act of 1987 (section 1103). House, Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1999, part 7, Environmental Protection Agency (105th Congress, 2nd session), pp. 55-59, 196-206, 1056-1063.
14. (back) This plan became the basis for the 1994 submission to the FCCC. For a further discussion of the plan, see Larry B. Parker and John E. Blodgett, Climate Change Action Plans, CRS Report 94-404.
20. (back) For further information, see: Wayne A. Morrissey, Global Climate Change: Adequacy of Commitments Under the U.N. Framework Convention and the Berlin Mandate, CRS Report 96-699.
21. (back) For further discussion, see: Susan R. Fletcher, Global Climate Change Treaty: Negotiations and Related Issues, CRS Report 97-1000.
25. (back) Larry Parker and John Blodgett, Global Climate Change: Reducing Greenhouse Gases: How Much from What Baseline, CRS Report 98-235.
26. (back) For a review of several cost analyses, see: Energy Information Administration, Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy Markets and Economic Activity, DOE Report SR/OIAF/98-03, October 1998, pp. 137-151.
29. (back) For further discussion of "back door" concerns, see Wayne A. Morrissey, Global Climate Change: Congressional Concern About "Back Door" Implementation of the 1997 U.N. Kyoto Protocol, CRS Report 98-664.
30. (back) For a review of proposed legislative vehicles to restrict Administration's actions with respect to Kyoto, see Wayne A. Morrissey, Global Climate Change: Congressional Concern About "Back Door" Implementation of the 1997 U.N. Kyoto Protocol, CRS Report 98-664; for a specific example of this suspicion, see: House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies. Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1999, Hearings, part 7: Environmental Protection Agency, pp. 54-59.
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