RS20734: Aviation Delays

J. Glen Moore

Specialist in Science and Technology
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

November 22, 2000

Summary

Flight delays and cancellation in the U.S. air transportation system rose to record levels in 2000. The problem costs the airlines an estimated $3 billion annually and causes great inconvenience for shippers and passengers. Billions of federal dollars are being spent to modernize the air traffic control (ATC) system, purchase new equipment and expand airport capacity. But the airlines express little confidence that these efforts will provide near-term relief or be enough in the long-term to accommodate the forecasted growth in air traffic ­ up from about 670 million passengers this year to 1.0 billion forecast by 2010 and 1.5 billion by 2025.

The ability of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to operate the ATC system, while simultaneously completing the modernization effort and overseeing airline safety, has been in question for some time. The rise in delays adds voice to calls for ATC reform and/or regulatory remedies. Since the mid 1980s, the airlines have pushed to have the ATC operate like a corporation, largely independent of the FAA. Others want a fully privatized the ATC system. Some have called for a return to government regulation of airline schedules, or at a minimum, to waive antitrust laws and allow the carriers to coordinate their own schedules. Still others want airports to take the lead and establish priority-pricing fees to constrain landings and takeoffs during peak periods at the busiest airports where the delay problem is the greatest.

It is generally agreed that the problem is likely to get worse before it gets better, and that correcting it is an evolutionary process that will take years to accomplish. The answer may lie in a mix of solutions ­ technology, more runways, airline scheduling, and airspace redesign among them. To effectively administer federal resources, policy makers need better information about the problem, including the numbers and causes of delays, the maximum traffic loads the ATC and airport systems can handle, and when and how much relief to expect from modernization efforts.Measuring Delay. At this time there is no uniform method of counting delays, reporting delays, or even defining delay. Inconsistencies and limitations in currently available delay statistics frustrate efforts to get a total count of delays from pre-gate departure to arrival. Nevertheless, by almost any measure, delays and cancellations in 2000 were up compared to 1999 making it one of the worst years on record for delay.

Uncertainty over the amount of delay in the system arises in part from two agencies in the Department of Transportation (DOT) collecting delay statistics by different means, for different purposes, using different definitions. The FAA tallies only ATC system delays for use in monitoring the performance of that system http://www.faa.gov/. It takes no account of airline schedules or cancellations. The Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), the other DOT agency, collects delay statistics based on published airline schedules for use in ranking air carriers by on-time performance http://www.bts.gov/. The two methods produce different results that bear little relationship to each other and together do not provide a complete picture of system delay.

In July 2000, the DOT Inspector General (IG) described current problems with the tracking methods used by the FAA and BTS and noted a rising trend in airline delays and cancellations.⁽¹⁾ Trends include:

1. Between 1995 and 1999, using BTS data, delays increased 11% (1,863,256 to 2,076,443); using FAA data, delays increased 58% (236,802 to 374,116). During this same period, total flight operations increased 8.3%, from about 64 million to 69.3 million.
2. In 1999, 1 in 5 flights arrived late, with each delay averaging about 50 minutes. In 2000, the average delay was nearly 55 minutes. With cancellations added in, nearly 1 in every 4 flights either arrived late or was cancelled ­ nearly 1.5 million flights were delayed or cancelled in 2000, perhaps more.
3. At the 28 largest U.S. airports, the number of flights with taxi-out time⁽²⁾ of 1 hour or more increased 130% over the past 5 years, with nearly 85% of all delay time occurring on the ground.

The IG found that the BTS on-time performance statistics significantly underreport the delay problem. From 1988-1999, the nation's 10 largest carriers increased their scheduled flight times on nearly 80%, or 1,600, of their domestic routes in order to compensate for growing delays. If the uninflated 1988 schedules were in effect, the IG found that the number of reported delays in 1999 would have been nearly 25% higher.

Causes of Delay. The high number of delays and cancellations in 2000 were attributed to a combination of dynamic factors including a higher-than-normal number of thunderstorms, growth in demand, and airline labor/maintenance troubles. These factors, however, are variable and somewhat of a given in air transportation. More troubling for policy makers are problems at the core of the air transportation system: an inefficient, outdated air traffic control system; a nearly depleted aviation radio frequency spectrum; insufficient airport capacity including runways and gates; and airline scheduling practices that allow airlines to schedule flights at any time they choose to almost any airport they choose.

While a precise picture of the causes of delay is not available, the FAA estimates from 70% to 80% of all ATC delays in any year are due to weather. From the airline perspective, weather delays are often due to overly conservative air traffic controllers who are slow to get traffic moving again when the weather breaks. But basically the airlines fault the FAA for many years of neglect in rebuilding the aviation infrastructure.⁽³⁾ The FAA and the controllers, in turn, fault airline scheduling practices which they say guarantee delays at peak times at busy airports even in good weather.⁽⁴⁾ Inadequate airport capacity is a core problem for which the FAA is sometimes blamed, but a final decision on when and where to build new airport infrastructure is the domain of local airport authorities ­ municipalities, counties, and State governments ­ not the FAA. Between 1991 and 1999, just 5 new runways were added at the nation's 29 largest airports where most of the delays occur.⁽⁵⁾

The finger-pointing seems to underscore the need for better data on the causes of delays and cancellations, which the IG also addressed in the July 2000 audit of delay statistics. The IG found that there is no system for collecting causal data or reporting a reasonably complete picture of the cause of delays and cancellations.⁽⁶⁾ Congress has already acted to remedy this by compelling airlines to disclose more fully the nature and source of delays and cancellations experienced by air travelers. Sec. 227 of P.L. 106-181, the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (FAIR-21), established a task force to categorize the reasons for delays and cancellations. Carriers will use these categories in the future when submitting monthly service reports to DOT.

Regional Jets. A relatively new phenomenon in aviation is the use of regional jets, smaller versions of the larger, more conventional airliner. Regional jets are rapidly replacing the slower and lower-flying turboprops. But because they fly at the same altitude and use the same runways as bigger jets, they put more demand on the system than turboprops. Nevertheless, regional jets are gaining favor with the industry and their use is expected to expand significantly in the future. In 1995 there were just 35 regional jets in the fleet. In 1999 there were 407. With a projected growth rate of 25% per year, by 2010 the fleet will number 1,500.⁽⁷⁾

Future Growth. According to DOT estimates, domestic enplanements will increase 3.4% per year from 2000 to 2025, rising from just over 600 million to about 1.4 billion.⁽⁸⁾ To accommodate this growth, the large air carrier jet passenger fleet is expected to increase from 4,355 to 9,941 aircraft. Enplanements in the regional/commuter segment of the industry are expected to outpace the large carriers during this period, with a 4.7% average annual growth rate. The regional fleet (turboprops plus jets) is expected to increase by 73%, from 2,237 aircraft in 1999 to 3,870 in 2025. In addition, the domestic air cargo industry is expected to grow by about 5% annually during this period, with the cargo fleet increasing from 1,046 aircraft in 2000 to 2,646 aircraft in 2025.

Administration and Congressional Actions. Responding to the rise in delays and cancellation in 1999, the FAA in cooperation with the airline industry, initiated in March 2000 a number of air traffic management actions known as the Spring/Summer 2000 Severe Weather Plan.⁽⁹⁾ Key elements of the Plan include better communication of weather information, reduced separation between aircraft, the use of lower level airspace especially by regional jets, and better use of military airspace off the East Coast during periods of severe weather. The FAA's command center in Herndon, VA, was given increased authority over ATC facilities around the country to keep airplanes moving and avoid bottlenecks.

Administration meetings with industry continued throughout the summer of 2000. In August DOT announced that it was moving forward with three new task forces that address the delay problem and the associated problem of airline customer service.⁽¹⁰⁾ One task force is aimed at facilitating the exchange of information, such as scheduling changes and flight cancellations, among different parts of the aviation industry. Another one, charged with identifying the "best practices" already being used by airlines to reduce the impact of delays on customers, reported its findings in October 2000.⁽¹¹⁾ A third task force will consider how best to spend the additional revenues allocated to aviation by FAIR-21.

For its part, the 106^th Congress held four oversight hearings on the problem of airline delays, as well as other hearings on the related problem of airline consumer rights.⁽¹²⁾ But its most important role is arguably played out through the budget process. How Congress chooses to allocate federal resources could have a major impact on the delay problem. In the spring of 2000, it passed FAIR-21, a 3-year FAA reauthorization bill, with a substantial increase in resources for the FAA and for airport capital improvements. It put close to $9 billion into ATC modernization over three years, which is about 50% more than current spending, and $10 billion into airports, a 70% increase from the current level.⁽¹³⁾ It also increased from $3 to $4.50 the Passenger Facility Charge airports can collect from passengers for infrastructure improvements. In addition, concern over delays and the way airlines were treating consumers prompted the airline service improvement measures which make up Title II of the act.

Technological Options. Technology is often seen as providing a quick solution for the delay problem. It will not.⁽¹⁴⁾ The modernization of the ATC system is important and will move forward, but it has never been seen as a complete answer. Most of the modernization effort is geared to replacing aging equipment with modern equipment that is more reliable and easier to operate and maintain, not to increasing system capacity.

Imbedded in the modernization effort is a new approach to air traffic management, which the FAA calls "free flight." Based on satellite navigation and the Global Positioning System (GPS), it promises to give pilots greater flexibility in choosing the most efficient routes and altitudes, saving the airlines time and money. Free flight is a promising capacity enhancer and is based on technology that is largely available, but it is not without risk. Free flight, like any other new aviation technology or procedure, must perform in a nearly flawless fashion. So far, the FAA has not been able to demonstrate that level of reliability.

Reform and Regulatory Options. The rise in airline delays and cancellations has led to calls to consider ATC reform and various regulatory options for the airline industry. The airlines and others have been calling for either a corporate operation or some form of privatization of the ATC since at least the mid 1980s.⁽¹⁵⁾ Robert Pool, president of the Reason Foundation, says, for example, that ATC privatization is "the critical next step to preserve the gains from airline deregulation by making the infrastructure flexible and market-driven."⁽¹⁶⁾

Alfred Kahn, who oversaw the deregulation of the airline industry in 1978, believes that the present state of congestion and delays is the result of two factors: failure to expand facilities and failure to "ration" airport use according to reasonable laws of supply and demand.⁽¹⁷⁾ Kahn, among others, proposes that airports alter their landing fee structures to reflect peak demand, charging more for the busiest times at congested airports and less for underused facilities. It is believed that the higher landing fees, reflected in higher ticket prices, would eventually force customers to adjust their schedules to less busy times and smaller, less busy regional airports.

The Clinton Administration also advocates ATC reform. Beginning in 1993, Vice President Gore called for moving the FAA's air traffic control operation into an independent government corporation.⁽¹⁸⁾ The Administration's FY1995 budget request included a proposal to create a not-for-profit government corporation, called the U.S. Air Traffic Services Corporation (USATS), which would be governed by a board of directors and a chief executive officer, and financed with cost-based charges on commercial airlines. USATS, however, was dead on arrival in Congress, with most Members objecting to the use of user fees to finance the ATC system. The Administration has continued to offer USATS or similar fee-based proposals in subsequent annual budget requests, with similar results from Congress. Over time, Congress has adopted some elements of the proposal, such as acquisition and personnel reform. In FAIR-21 Congress adopted still more reforms, including some from the Administration's 1998 proposal to make ATC a performance-based organization within the FAA. FAIR-21 creates a five-member Air Traffic Services Subcommittee, comparable to a board of directors, to oversee ATC operations (Sec. 302); and it establishes the position of Chief Operating Officer for air traffic services (Sec. 303).

Despite the changes, Congress has shown little interest in fee-based pricing for ATC services, the centerpiece of the Administration's proposal. FAIR-21, while it boosted the allowable passenger facility fee, does not link what users pay to the services they use. The Administration continues to urge Congress to replace the ticket tax with cost-based charges on commercial airlines, arguing that the ATC system must have the ability to price its services in order to balance supply and demand.⁽¹⁹⁾

Outlook. Most would agree that airline delays and cancellations are on the rise and the problem is likely to get worse before its gets better. But there is no general agreement on how much delay is in the system now, what causes delay, or what should be done to bring the problem into check. Better information may be one part of the answer. Mr. Ken Mead, the DOT IG, told Congress that poor federal record keeping on the numbers and causes of delays is making it difficult to combat the rising trend in delays.⁽²⁰⁾ Congress has already taken steps to make airlines provide better information on the source of delays, but there is much about the delay problem that is still not known. For example, the FAA does not know what traffic load the ATC and airport systems can handle without suffering major delays ­ now and into the future; or how much relief technological options, such as free flight, can provide ­ and on what timetable. The effective allocation of resources may depend upon Congress having answers to questions such as these.

Footnotes

1. ^(back)U.S. Department of Transportation. Office of Inspector General. Audit report. Air Carrier Delays and Cancellations. Report no.: CR-2000-112. July 25, 2000. http://www.oig.dot.gov/.

2. ^(back)Taxi-out time comprises the period between an aircraft departing the gate and lift off.

3. ^(back)Remarks of Carol Hallett, President and CEO of the Air Transport Association. ATC Users' Forum, Reno, Nevada, June 21, 2000.

4. ^(back)U.S. Congress. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation. Hearings on airline delays: the summer of our discontent. September 28, 2000. Statement by John Carr, President of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association.

5. ^(back)International Aviation Club, October 23, 2000. Remarks by Kenneth Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation. http://www.iacwashington.org/.

6. ^(back)Ob cit, audit report CR-2000-112, July 25, 2000.

7. ^(back)U.S. Department of Transportation. Bureau of Transportation Statistics. The Changing Face of Transportation. Draft report. September 2000, p. 2-24. http://www.bts.gov/.

8. ^(back)Ibid.

9. ^(back)U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration. Press Release DOT-51-00, Mar. 10, 2000.

10. ^(back)U.S. Department of Transportation. Press release 152-00, Aug. 21, 2000.

11. ^(back) U.S. Department of Transportation. Best Practices for Improving the Air Travel Experience. October 2000. http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/.

12. ^(back)Staff background papers and selected testimony for hearings held by the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, on October 14, 1999 and September 28, 2000, are on the Internet at http://www.house.gov/transportation/. Hearings by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, on September 14, 2000, and the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, on July 25, 2000, are not on the Internet.

13. ^(back)Airport improvement program: issue brief. Congressional Research Service. Product number IB10026. Regularly updated.

14. ^(back)Op cit, International Aviation Club. Ken Mead.

15. ^(back)See, for example: U.S. Congress. House Committee on Public Works and Transporation, Subcommittee on Aviation. Hearings on proposals to improve the effectiveness of the Federal Aviation Administration. June 2 and 22, 1988.

16. ^(back)Radical Solutions to Airline Delays Gets More Attention. Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Mass., Oct. 20, 1999.

17. ^(back)Turbulent Times for Air Travelers. Hartford Courant, Hartford, Conn., Aug. 22, 2000.

18. ^(back) Vice President Al Gore. From Red Tape to Results. Creating a Government that Works Better & Costs Less. A report of the National Performance Review. September 7, 1993. http://www.npr.gov/library/review.html.

19. ^(back)International Aviation Club, July 18, 2000. Remarks by Dorothy Robyn, Special Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, National Economic Council. http://www.iacwashington.org/.

20. ^(back)U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation. Hearings on the growth and causes of airline flight delays and cancellations, and airline efforts to improve customer service. July 25, 2000. Statement by Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation.